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ABSTRACT 
 This research was conducted to examine the quantitative and qualitative 
component requirements for the Tier II and Tier III of the United States Marine Corps 
Unmanned Aerial Systems Program.  The main objective of this research is to develop a 
proposed manpower structure for a composite squadron in order to improve current UAS 
capabilities while minimizing manpower requirements.  
 This was accomplished by conducting an independent assessment of manpower 
requirements of the different strategies being considered under the Unmanned Aerial 
Systems Family of Systems (UAS FoS) for the Marine Corps for the Tier II and III.   
 In the final analysis, the research recommends the consolidation of the Tiers II 
and III to form a composite UAV squadron, reduce the logistics footprint by relegating 
the support mission to the MWSS and the MALS, and combining operational and 
maintenance billets within the current VMU structure to consolidate manpower 
requirements and optimize UAS force structures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this research is to examine the quantitative and qualitative 
manpower requirements of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) program for the implementation of a Tier II/III Unmanned Air System 
Family of Systems (UAS FoS) manpower structure that complements the development of 
new technologies in this field.  The Marine Corps is composed of three UAS tiers. Tier I 
is currently serviced by the Dragon Eye UAV and is an organic component of the Ground 
Combat Element (GCE) at the Infantry Battalion (Bn) level.  It also supports units at 
lower levels of command within an infantry Bn down to the squad level.  ScanEagle is 
the Tier II UAS. It supports the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and is currently filled 
by a fee-for-service contract with Boeing Corporation. The Tier III requirement is 
currently filled by the RQ-2 Pioneer, which has been in service with the USMC since 
1986.  This UAS currently fulfils the UAS strategic role at the Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF).1  
 The primary objective of this research is to develop a proposed UAS manpower 
structure to support the mid-level tier of the UAS FoS within the USMC, also known as 
Tier II. The study will consider the required manpower structure by Military 
Occupational Field (MOS) to grow a Tier II UAS structure as well as the training 
component required to develop this force within the USMC.  
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
 This research will encompass an independent assessment of manpower 
requirements of the Tier II and Tier III structures needed to fulfill the mission of the 
Unmanned Aerial Systems Family of Systems (UAS FoS) for these tiers in the USMC.  
This will be accomplished by analyzing the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle squadron 
(VMU) manpower structure and developing the manpower requirements to support the 
Tier II UAS FoS capability currently under development. The research will also include 
an assessment of the establishment of a training facility that will allow for more realistic 
                                                 
1 MCCDC, USMC VISION. UAS Family of Systems (FoS) Document. September 2005. 
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and hands on training to ensure newly trained Marines are able to developed the 
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) required to effectively performed their duties.  In 
addition, the research will review the possibility of establishing a composite VMU 
squadron (VMUX), where the Tier II and Tier III systems can be combined into one 
efficient and effective squadron that reduces manpower requirements and logistical 
footprint and improves mission capabilities. This study will provide an understanding of 
the synergy that might be created from a composite (Tier II and III) UAS squadron and 
the implications of the ownership and location of these squadrons in relation to their 
ability to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.  Primary Questions 
• What notional manpower structure would best support the Tier II and 
Tier III mission requirements of the UAS FoS? 
2.   Secondary Questions 
• What notional logistics support is required to maintain and operate a 
deployed UAS unit? 
C. DISCUSSION 
The USMC’s UAS FoS has undergone substantial growth in the past decade. 
Since the inception of the RQ-2 Pioneer (Tier III) in 1986 and Dragon Eye (Tier I) in 
2003, the technology has evolved from simple hand-held and easy launch systems to 
more complex and flexible systems that are capable of carrying combat payloads.2  At 
this pace, this type of capability will allow ground forces to improve their visibility and 
decision making on the battlefield to achieve mission goals and objectives. Both 
commercial and government agencies have realized the considerable benefits of UAS 
technology in the battlefield, propagating their growth beyond the initial requirement to 
                                                 
2 OSD. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap. 2005-2030. p. 8. 
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gather intelligence, scan and observe ahead of troops, and provide real-time feedback on 
the battle assessment during contingency operations. 
One of the biggest challenges for the Marine Corps is its ability to grow and 
maintain these UAS units without increasing the manpower requirements to augment the 
ever-growing need for the capability across the Marine Corps. The increased demand for 
these assets in the battlefield has consumed the limited capability and available resources 
of the only two active-duty Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle squadrons (VMU). VMU-1 
is located at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), 29 Palms, CA and 
VMU-2 is located at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Cherry Point, NC. These two 
VMU squadrons have been alternating deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  To meet the 
future needs of the MAGTF, the Marine Corps is looking at technological advances to 
adopt UAS platforms that will augment current and future Marine Corps capabilities and 
requirements in this field.  
Until recently, the parameters and doctrine governing the UAS community in the 
Marine Corps were limited in scope and cost assessment. The increased demand in 
missions for irregular warfare and new operating conditions means that current UAS 
platforms must be more advanced (i.e., multi-mission, increased range, more 
autonomous) in order to meet MAGTF requirements. Advances in UAS technology have 
made it possible for the Marine Corps to be ambitious and demanding about the types of 
platforms they need to meet dynamic threats and UAS mission criteria.    
To meet UAS demands throughout the USMC, the Marine Corps Systems 
Command (MCSC) is exploring new visions and capabilities to meet the UAS needs of 
the future.  The current tier structure allows the MAGTF to divide the battlefield 
according to the range, endurance and capability of each asset. As stated, the Tier I role is 
currently filled by the Dragon Eye, but the USMC has plans to transition from this 
platform to the RQ-11 Raven.  For the Tier III, USMC planners have established 
timelines for the replacement of the RQ-2 Pioneer since this platform does not meet the 
future concept of employment for this tier.3 The Tier III is still being analyzed to 
                                                 
3 MCCDC, USMC VISION. UAS Family of Systems (FoS) Document. September 2005. 
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determine capability requirements and structure. This study, which focuses on Tier II, 
will look for the development of a well-defined manpower structure and to replace the 
fee-for-service contract for the ScanEagle UAS.  Based on the USMC UAS FoS vision 
for 2005 developed by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), the 
requirement for any UAS is to provide each level of the MAGTF with a tactical, organic, 
joint interoperable, integrated, and tailored capability that gives situational awareness to 
the warfighter through a common Command and Control (C2) architecture across the 
range of military operations.4 
The manpower requirements development process to support these capabilities 
must take into consideration the type of system used for each level; the training 
requirements needed to grow each tier; and the impact on other units associated with the 
maintenance and support of these systems.  
D BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
 This study provides the Marine Corps with a proposed template for the 
implementation of combined manpower structure for the Tiers II and III. It also addresses 
the importance of the KSAs required to support and maintain the personnel structure in 
these tiers. The study will also evaluate the feasibility and benefits of recommending a 
composite squadron for the Tier II and III to minimize the manpower requirements to 
support separate squadrons and maximize the concentration of capabilities and resources.  
E. SCOPE 
 The scope includes: (1) A review of the background and history of the USMC 
UAS program; (2) an in-depth review of UAS platforms currently operating in the USMC 
and their manpower structure and support systems, as well as the planned replacements 
for these platforms; (3) a feasibility study for the implementation of a Tier II/III 
manpower structure to operate in teams or as a detachment, according to mission needs. 
The thesis will conclude with a recommendation for the manning and training of an 
organic Tier II/III UAS FoS force structure.  
                                                 
4 MCCDC, USMC VISION. UAS Family of Systems (FoS) Document. September 2005 
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F.   METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following: 
• Conduct a literature search of documents, doctrine, publications, and 
current manpower structure of UAS platforms in the military. 
• Conduct a review of UAS vision, plans, and projects underway by Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and MCSC to develop 
requirements, compatibility issues, capability needs and standards across 
systems. 
• Conduct a review of the Army’s Shadow UAS project to compare and 
contrast capabilities and mission needs.  
• Examine capabilities of the current UAS systems in operation within the 
Marine Corps (Pioneer and Scan Eagle) and documented the requirements 
of the MAGTF on these systems. 
• Conduct a visit to an operational UAV Squadron, the UAS School in 
Pensacola, and an Army UAS facility to observe operation and discuss 
differences between the Army and USMC requirements, implementation 
and maintenance costs, and lessons learned. 
• Identify all potential courses of action to implement the manpower 
requirements. 
• Prepare a target proposal for the development of the manpower structure 
required for a Tier II and III of UAS FoS in the USMC to support the 
different levels of MAGTF. 
• Evaluate and proposed the location and units where these systems could 
reside.  
G.   THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION. This chapter discusses the purpose and 
description of the thesis and the benefits of this study. It also details the methodology, 
scope and organization of the thesis. 
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 CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE USMC UAS 
PROGRAM. This chapter covers the life of the UAS program, starting with the RQ-2 
Pioneer in 1986 and leading to the current status of the UAS program in the USMC. It 
also includes an overview of the future programs that are being tested to replace some of 
the aging UAS programs in the USMC.   
CHAPTER III: CURRENT AND FUTURE USMC UNMANNED AERIAL 
SYSTEMS.  This chapter focuses on UAS platforms currently operated within the 
USMC and their manpower structures. It discusses the mission and purpose, system 
description, general characteristics, capabilities, and manpower requirements of each 
UAS platform to include the proposed replacement platform for each tier. 
CHAPTER IV: PROPOSED UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM 
MANPOWER STRUCTURE FOR A COMPOSITE SQUADRON.  This chapter 
offers a notional manpower structure template for the Tier II/III to form a composite 
squadron to minimize manpower requirements and concentrate resources and capabilities 
to meet the future needs of Marine Corps UAS requirements.  
 CHAPTER V: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.  
This chapter summarizes the study and provides conclusions, including the development 
of strategies offered for the Tier II manpower component. It also provides 
recommendations for the implementation of this manpower structure as well as 
answering secondary questions. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE USMC UAS 
PROGRAM 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The introduction of UAVs in the Armed Forces took time and considerable effort to 
incorporate.  Service traditions played a factor in the debate over who would control 
UAVs and what UAVs would be allowed to enter the acquisition process.  Drones such 
as the Ryan-modified Firebee, used in Vietnam for low-altitude reconnaissance, were an 
easy fit to the Air Force missions of the time. High-altitude, long-endurance platforms 
with autonomous flight completed some successful test flights in the 1960s and 1970s, 
but ultimately found no long-term buyers.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Ryan-modified Firebee Drone 
 
 
 When the Navy and Marine Corps bought the Pioneer in 1985, the argument 
about who should own UAVs had shifted to who should be allowed to pilot them. The 
Air Force, in its service tradition, was reluctant to agree with the other Services that 
allowed enlisted personnel to be trained to perform the duties of the pilot and payload 
operator in a UAV.  After its performance in Desert Storm, and the now famous story of 
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how one group of Iraqi troops tried to surrender to a Navy Pioneer UAV, there was no 
doubt that this asset was not prejudice against who controlled the system, but how it was 
used to achieve mission performance.  
After logging over 900 hours during operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
the Pioneer became a legend, and the Air Force lagged so far behind in UAV operations 
that many of the drones had to be borrowed from the Navy.5 
Following the success of UAVs during Desert Storm, concepts changed and the 
development of capabilities for UAVs took a dramatic turn for the best. The Global 
Positioning System and more extensive satellite communications made remote-site 
control and in-flight rerouting of UAV missions easier and more effective to the 
requirements of field commanders. Commanders also wanted more real-time 
reconnaissance and surveillance to enable them to better assess the battlefield. The 
incorporation of increased bandwidth via satellite communications opened up new 
possibilities. 
B. EARLY UAV PROGRAMS IN THE MARINE CORPS 
1. Remotely Piloted Helicopters (RPHs)  
The earliest historic data of Unmanned Vehicle research and testing goes back to 
the 1950s with the concept of Remotely Piloted Helicopters (RPH).  After being sold on 
the idea of helicopters, the Marine Corps became more interested in the development of 
this technology for other Corps specific missions.  One of the disadvantages of the 
helicopter fleet was the workload and manpower required to equip the Marine Operating 
Forces with enough helicopters to meet all of its requirements.  In a concept paper 
published in 1954, titled “A Study of Marine Corps Requirements for the Remotely 
Controlled Rotary Wing Aircraft,” the discussion centered on the use of (RPHs) instead 
of manned helicopters to meet missions requirements. This concept paper argued that the 
RPHs had three advantages over manned helicopters: they were more cost effective, they 
                                                 
5 Air Force Magazine Online.  http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept2005. Accessed March 2007. 
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would reduce the exposure of helicopter crews to potentially harmful situations, and they 
would reduce the workload of manned helicopter crews. A year later, after prototypes 
from Kaman Corporation were evaluated by Experimental Helicopter Squadron One 
(EHS-1) and the Landing Force Development Center (LFDC), the Marine Corps planned 
to activate three RPH squadrons beginning in fiscal year 1959 (FY-59).   The squadrons 
never materialized because the evaluation demonstrated no advantage over a manned 
helicopter. The demonstration highlighted some shortfalls that the Marine Corps was 
unable to overcome. It showed that the RPHs were more expensive than anticipated, less 
reliable than their manned counterparts, and more difficult to operate than originally 
planned. This was the end of the RPH program.6  
2. Bikini Drones  
Unwilling to scrap all of the research and development with unmanned vehicles, 
the Marine Corps continued to pursue this technology with a new approach under the 
code name Bikini. While the RPH concept was tested and evaluated for the feasibility of 
a utility vehicle, the Bikini concept was evaluated for the feasibility of providing organic 
near real-time reconnaissance to the battalion commander in the field. The Bikini 
program started in 1959 and was under research and development for seven years before 
it was tested for its feasibility. According to the R&D specifications, this system would 
only require a two-man team — one to operate the vehicle and the other one to maintain 
it. In true Marine Corps fashion and according to doctrine, the unmanned drone and its 
team of two Marines would be attached to the infantry battalions and perform 
reconnaissance missions in support of the battlefield commander.7  
 The configuration of the drone system (the drone and all of its support 
requirements) was designed to fit in one jeep and one trailer. To be more efficient in the 
deployment and employment of the system, the trailer would double as a launcher as well 
as a cargo carrier. The battalion’s flamethrower compressor would recharge the 
                                                 
6 Major L. R. Fuchs, USMC. “Unmanned Aircraft” Marine Corps Gazette, October l98l. 
7 Major L. P. Charon, USMC, “Front Line Photo Drone Ready for Robot Recon,” Marine Corps 
Gazette, August l966. 
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pneumatic launcher, and the air vehicle would be recovered by the operator flying the 
drone by cutting the engine and activating the parachute release. The drone carried a 
70mm camera whose film had to be developed, like any other camera, by either the 
division reconnaissance battalion or by the team using a newly developed waterless film 
processor.  An important development from the Bikini drone was the Concept of 
Employment that came of this project, which is remarkably similar to the standing 
Marine Corps Concept of Employment for the Close Range UAV published by MCCDC, 
in 1992.8 
 After testing, the Marine Corps purchased twenty Bikini drones, and establish 
their residence for further testing and evaluation with the Headquarters and Service 
Company, 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, NC. 
After only one year of testing with this unit, and over 300 flights later, the results were 
not positive. Of the original twenty air vehicles, only six remained.  From the fourteen 
vehicles damaged, eleven were lost due to operator error, with the majority of the errors 
occurring during landing and takeoffs. Despite the proven potential for UAVs in the 
battlefield, Bikini was a risk that Marine Corps planners at the time were not willing to 
take. The system was not suitable for the time, and it would have to be shelved until 
further development.  
3. Dash and Project Snoopy 
In 1969, not too long after discarding the RPHs, the Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA) developed some advanced applications of a similar RPH called 
Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH) also known as the QH-50.  The DASH was 
originally developed to extend the range of the Navy’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
capability a safe distance from the ship.   
                                                 
8 Major H. L. Scott, “Tactical Imagery Processing,” Marine Corps Gazette, September l966. 
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Figure 2.   QH-50 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (AUV) 
 
 
The DASH did not survive testing and field applications in its current 
configuration.  Consequently, Project Snoopy became the first advance application of the 
DASH. It equipped the drone with television cameras for beach reconnaissance and naval 
gunfire spotting along the coast of Vietnam. Further developments included payload 
packages with low light level television, lasers for range finding, and armaments of .50 
caliber guns, Gatling guns, or hypervelocity guns. The drone was capable of carrying 
payloads of up to 1,000 pounds.  
 Eventually, the Marine Corps got involved with DASH during operation Nite 
Panther. In contrast with the Navy version, the Marine DASH was equipped with a jeep 
configured as a Ground Control Station (GCS) in order to go ashore. The intent of the 
operation was to have the Marines take control of a ship-launched drone and execute 
clandestine reconnaissance and targeting missions while ashore. This was the first 
attempt at the “Hub and spoke” concept that is now practiced with the RQ-2 Pioneer and 
Scan Eagle UAVs.  Upon completing the mission, they would hand over control of the 
drone back to the ship for recovery. From the trials of the DASH, 58 vehicles were lost 
during this time, but these losses could not be solely attributed to either enemy action or 
operator/malfunction error. Lower than expected performance played a major role in the 
outcome of the program.  
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 The program was cancelled in 1971 due to an overwhelming number of lost 
systems during peacetime operations and a lower than expected performance rate as 
stated by the Secretary of Defense at that time, Robert McNamara.  Of the 750 drones 
built during this period, 411 crashed within a ten-year span.  In the eyes of the Defense 
department, DASH attrition was attributed to poor management.  The system was 
exposed to corrosion problems, high crew turnover, improper maintenance procedures, 
and the crew lacked flight proficiency because of long periods without training.9 
In contrast to the American performance record, the Japanese, who were flying 
similar systems, were able to achieve 1,440 flight hours with only four losses. This was 
four times better than the American average. The Japanese program was more 
disciplined, and they emphasized crew cohesion as well as a daily training program. They 
maintained crews together for years and followed a detailed maintenance program 
prescribed by the manufacturers.   
The DASH program was built under a false sense of urgency, and no one realized 
how much money and effort would be required to make the system work well.  Looking 
back at the program, one can assume that if more emphasis had been placed on the 
DASH during its development and testing, many design flaws and deficiencies could 
have been resolved, and its management problems could have been corrected.  When 
Secretary McNamara cut the DASH program, the Navy decided to immediately replace 
the DASH with the SH-2D Seasprite helicopter, claiming that its evolving mission was 
too critical to rely on an unmanned drone.   Despite the fact that the DASH was originally 
a Navy program, the Marine Corps was able to draw some very important lessons that 
would later become the foundation of their UAV program. 
4.  The Revitalization of UAVs 
During the mid 1970s and early 1980s, all of the Services were revitalizing their 
interest in UAVs. More importantly, the Marine Corps outlined its UAV requirements in 
                                                 
9 Jack Kestner, “Navy Dumps DASH after $250 Million Dollar Cost,” Ledger-Star, September 27, 
197l. 
 13
the l975 Mid-range Plan.  Conversely, Congress was not very supportive of the Services 
as they were not showing a dramatic increase in performance, efficiency, or cost.  
Interestingly enough, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was trying to rekindle the 
military’s affair with UAVs because they believed UAVs could be more cost-effective 
than manned aircraft. In 1981, the GAO, in its report to Congress titled “DoD’s Use of 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle Technology Offers Opportunities for Saving Lives and 
Dollars,” claimed that the Services were reluctant to field UAVs because pilots feared a 
lack of job security. In its findings, the report alluded to pilot fears of being replaced by 
the drones and suffering the effects of reduced promotions and manpower cuts in their 
field. The report concluded with a strong recommendation to give UAVs adequate 
consideration for specific missions.10 
C. THE MARINE CORPS’ FIRST OFFICIAL UAV (RQ-2 PIONEER) 
 Early in 1980, the Navy began the employment of remotely piloted vehicles 
(RPV) on battleships like the Iowa-class, to gather imagery intelligence (IMINT) for 
spotters in support of naval gunfire. This process began as a requirement from the Navy 
to search for a system that would deliver the unique needs of the Navy and Marine Corps 
onboard ships.  The Marine Corps adopted the Pioneer 1986 after an interim program 
adopted from the Navy in 1985.11   
 The historic link between Pioneer (the first USMC UAS) and the United States 
Marine Corps began long before the first acquisition of the asset in 1985. The Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the catalyst that sparked the Marine Corps’ interest in 
Pioneer when Israel launched Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE.  During this time, 
Lebanon had been under the political control of Syria. It was a safe-haven for the PLO, 
and it was also occupied by a large Syrian military force.  Israel was aware that, in order 
to mount a successful ground campaign, it had to master the skies and ensure air 
superiority.  
                                                 
10 General Accounting Office Report to Congress MASAD-8l-20, 3 “DoD’s Use of Remotely Piloted 
Vehicle Technology Offers Opportunities For Saving Lives And Dollars.” April 1981. 
11 Website Israeli Weapons. http://www.israeli-
weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/uav/pioneer/Pioneer.html. Accessed March 2007. 
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 The Israelis knew that controlling Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley was critical in order to 
break the lines of communication with Damascus.  The challenge for Israel was to find a 
way to neutralize the Syrian Air Defense Network that defended this key terrain. In a 
strategy developed by the Israeli military planners, their solution to this tremendous 
challenge was to flood the skies above the Bekaa Valley with a fleet of unmanned aerial 
vehicles.  The UAVs would be equipped with transponders that simulated the electronic 
signature of actual attack aircraft. The outcome was a complete success as the Syrian 
SAM sites began to engage these drones.  Once the Syrian SAM positions were 
compromised and they had spent all of their missiles on the UAVs, Israeli attack jets 
rushed to the scene and engaged the SAM sites with anti-radiation missiles.  In the 
aftermath, the Israeli Air Force did not lose a single manned aircraft during the attack and 
went on to achieve complete air supremacy in the skies over Lebanon. 
 After the disastrous suicide attack against the Marine Barracks in Beirut, which 
killed 241 American servicemen, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) General 
P. X. Kelley traveled to Israel to visit the Marine barracks. Israeli’s UAVs had captured 
images of the CMC standing in the rubble of the destroyed Marine barracks. This video 
impressed the CMC so much that, upon his return to the United States, General Kelley 
shared that experience with then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. Based on Israel’s 
previous success with UAV systems, coupled with the recommendations of the CMC, 
Secretary Lehman was insistent on rapid procurement of an unmanned aerial vehicle 
system for use by the Navy and Marine Corps.   
 Secretary Lehman became the primary advocate behind the acquisition of the 
Israeli Mastiff UAV System. This was a simple, inexpensive solution to the problem of 
reconnaissance and target acquisition.  It was Secretary Lehman who helped establish a 
bilateral agreement with the Israeli government to acquire the famous UAVs. Later, in 
January of 1984, Marines from the 2nd Marine Division, (10th Marine Artillery 
Regiment’s Target Acquisition Battery, Detachment Alpha) secretly traveled to Israel to 
learn to operate and maintain the Mastiff UAV system.  For a price tag of $7.5 million, 
the Israeli military would teach the Marine unit how to operate and maintain the Mastiff 
UAV system.  
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 After extensive training and having gained real-world experience operating the 
Mastiff system with their Israeli’s counterparts, the Marines of the 10th Marine Artillery 
Regiment returned to the United States, and on August 22, 1984, the detachment was 
transferred to Headquarters Battalion, 2nd Marine Division and was re-designated as the 
1st Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Platoon.  Though the newly formed unit was 
challenged by an unusual amount of logistical and technical difficulties, the 1st RPV 
Platoon successfully employed the Mastiff UAV in support of a number of Navy and 
Marine Corps exercises.  At the time, the system was under the operational control of the 
Atlantic Fleet Commander.12 
 The platoon’s successes with the Mastiff UAV validated the merits of unmanned 
aviation, and the Department of the Navy soon solicited defense contractors for an off-
the-shelf UAV system more capable than the Mastiff.  At the end of this process, the 
winner of the bid was the RQ-2 Pioneer. This UAV was also developed by the Israelis, 
and it was the direct descendant of the Mastiff UAV.  In an effort to streamline the 
process and avoid the pitfalls that followed the acquisition of the Army’s Aquila and 
Skyeye, Secretary Lehman designated the Pioneer an “interim” system intended only to 
fill the gap until a permanent solution could be achieved. Both of these Army UAVs 
concepts had been under intense scrutiny by the GAO. The Aquila had been under 
development for ten years — with a price tag of $2.4 billion. The Skyeye UAV was large 
and it was designed for heavy payloads to operate in Central and South America.  
                                                 




Figure 3.   RQ-2A Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
 
 After extensive trials and the interim period that followed, in 1991, a joint venture 
was formed between Aircraft Armaments Incorporated (AAI) and Israel Aircraft 
Industries, Ltd. (IAI Ltd.), the latter of which developed the current RQ-2B Pioneer. This 
new corporation was named Pioneer UAV, Inc. and its purpose was to manage the RQ-2 
Pioneer program as the prime contractor to the U.S. Government. Pioneer UAV Inc. is 
currently located in Hunt Valley, Maryland.  It maintains resident expertise in quality 
assurance, program management, configuration management, finance, business 
development, procurement, logistics support, subcontract, and contract management.  
 During the 1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps operated the RQ-2 Pioneer with 
great success. This proved particularly effective during operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm. During this decade, the Navy began to develop a more focused UAV effort 
towards unmanned surface vehicles (USV).  This resulted in the transfer of all Pioneer 
UAV assets to the Marine Corps by the end of the decade. 
 Since then, the Marine Corps has employed the Pioneer as a means to provide 
near real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence to commanders in the field.  
Originally, Pioneer was enlisted to fill the Tier III UAS requirement for the USMC.  It is 
currently being employed as a Tier II asset in OIF/OEF. In the future, the Vertical 
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Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aircraft System (VTUAS) will replace Pioneer to 
become the Marine Corps’ Tier III asset. Pioneer is due to phase out by 2015. 
 
Figure 4.   RQ-2B Pioneer UAV Model 
 
D. HISTORY OF THE MARINE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE 
SQUADRON (VMU) 
The Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle squadron (VMU) has its roots far from its 
current composition and mission.  As stated earlier, during January 1984, 10th Marine 
Artillery Regiment’s Target Acquisition Battery Detachment Alpha were the first 
Marines to be assigned to train in the Mastiff UAV system in Israel.  Upon their return in 
June of 1984, the unit was designated as the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) 
Detachment.  On August 22, 1984, the detachment was reorganized, and re-designated, as 
the 1st Remotely Piloted Vehicle Platoon, Headquarters Battalion, 2nd Marine Division.  
As part of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th MEU), the 1st RPV Platoon 
was embarked aboard the USS Tarawa for operations in the western Pacific.  In October 
1986, the 1st RPV Platoon was once again reorganized and re-designated as the 2nd RPV 
Company, Headquarters Battalion, 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, NC. In 1987, 
the Marine Corps received its first two RQ-2A Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Systems.  In the 
following few years, the 2nd RPV Company consistently trained and deployed within the 
United States in support of several Marine Corps exercises.  
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E. SUBSEQUENT EVOLUTION OF VMU-1 & VMU-2 
In February 1989, RPV units were incorporated into the Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG) concept as an independent company 
under the Group command.  In August 1990, the 2d RPV Company was reassigned to the 
4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB) and embarked to the Middle East region in 
support of Operation Desert Shield.  The company remained embarked with the 4th MEB 
until November 1990. Thereafter, the company was ordered ashore and reassigned to the 
1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group, I Marine Expeditionary Force 
(I MEF).  
During January 1991, the company deployed to Saudi Arabia in direct support of 
the 2nd Marine Division and later conducted missions in support of Operation Desert 
Storm. From February to March of 1991, direct support of Operation Desert Storm was 
conducted from Al Qurah. 2d RPV Company began retrograde operations and returned to 
Camp Lejeune on March 1991. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 2nd RPV 
Company flew a total of 69 sorties and 226 flight hours. Of these, 55 sorties and 192 
flight hours were performed during combat operations. No Pioneer air vehicles were lost 
as a result of enemy action. 
During May 1991, a detachment from 2nd RPV Company was formed to 
participate in Operation Provide Comfort and the Kurdish relief effort in northern Iraq. 
These Marines provided surveillance information during the conduct of the operation. 
The detachment returned to Camp Lejeune, NC, on May 31,1991. For the remainder of 
1991, the company provided support to various elements of the II Marine Expeditionary 
Force (II MEF). 
On January 1993, 2nd RPV Company was re-designated as the 2nd Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company and, in February 1994, the company was re-equipped 
with the Pioneer Option II Plus air vehicle. On January 1996, 2nd UAV Company was 
reorganized under Marine Aviation sponsorship and re-designated as Marine Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle squadron 2 (VMU-2). Placed under Marine Aircraft Group 14, 2nd 
Marine Aircraft Wing, the squadron was relocated to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry 
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Point, NC, in May 1996. Then, in August 2000, VMU-2 was re-assigned to Marine Air 
Control Group 28, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. 
Similarly, on January 1987, a new unit, 1st RPV Company, was activated at 
Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) 29 Palms, California, as part of 
the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade followed by 3rd RPV Company in June 1987.  On 
December 1989, 1st and 3rd RPV Companies were reassigned to the 1st Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group.  On January 1994, 1st RPV Company and 3rd 
RPV Company were integrated as one unit to form the 1st Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) Company.  On January 1996, 1st UAV Company was re-designated Marine 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle squadron 1 (VMU-1) and was reassigned to Marine Aircraft 
Group 13, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. During January 2000, VMU-1 was reassigned to 
Marine Air Control Group 38, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing.13 
VMU-1 is located at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) 
29 Palms, CA. VMU-2 is located at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, NC. 
VMUs operate the RQ-2 Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which provides 
Marine ground forces with information, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance. They also provide artillery spotting and can assist in search and rescue 
operations. Since 2004, the VMU squadrons have also been operating with the ScanEagle 
UAV which is a fee-for service contract with Boeing Corp. Both of these systems will 
eventually be replaced by the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aircraft System 
(VTUAS).  
The squadron has approximately 180 Marines and four Pioneer Systems with all 
of the logistical support required to operate as a unit.  Appendix A is a copy of the table 




                                                 
13 Dave Funkhouser (USMC Captain), The History of VMU-1, January 2004.  
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III. CURRENT AND FUTURE USMC UNMANNED AERIAL 
SYSTEMS 
A. MARINE CORPS’ UAS CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
The Marine Corps’ Unmanned Aerial Systems Family of Systems (UAS FoS) was 
developed to provide each level of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) an 
organic, interoperable, integrated and tailored capability providing warfighter situational 
awareness through a common C2 architecture across the range of military operations.14  
The concept of employment for the three USMC UAS FoS tiers was developed to satisfy 
the needs of the commander at every level of operational support (battalion, regiment, 
MEF).  A conscientious effort was made to ensure these tiers overlapped to enhance the 
operational capability of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) assets at all levels.  This 
concept of employment is meant to coincide with the level of unit they support.  
The first aggregate level, called Tier I, comprises Dragon Eye UAV, but transition 
to the RQ-11B Raven B is expected in the near future. Its purpose is to provide short-
duration reconnaissance and surveillance at the battalion and below level. This small unit 
UAS and its video is not available beyond the user at that level. This is what the Marines 
call “Over the next Hill/building reconnaissance” capability.15  
The Marine Corps does not have a Tier II program of record (POR), but it 
employs the ScanEagle UAV systems under a fee-for-service agreement with Boeing 
Corporation to fill this Tier II capability gap. Along with ScanEagle, this tier is also 
supported by RQ-2 Pioneer.  This tier supports the Marine Division, Regimental, 
Battalion and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU).16  
 The Marine Corps' Tier III UAS is the RQ-2 Pioneer even though it is not used in 
its official role as a Tier III asset. Tier III provides target acquisition and designation, 
                                                 
14 MCCDC, USMC VISION. UAV Family of Systems (FoS) Document. September 2005. 
15 LtGen John G. Castellaw,  DC Aviation, Fiscal Year 2007 Marine Corps tactical Air Programs, 
March 2006.  
16 Ibid. 
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reconnaissance and surveillance and radio relay to the Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) or the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The RQ-2 Pioneer is operated by the 
two active duty VMUs (VMU-1 and VMU-2).  It supports tasking from subordinate units 
of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) by providing intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and target acquisition to Marine ground combat elements, including 
direct support to Marine Division and Regiments.17  
 
Figure 5.   USMC UAS FoS Three Tier Concept 
 
 
B. CURRENT MARINE CORPS UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
The Marine Corps has two fielded UAS programs of record: Dragon Eye and RQ-
2 Pioneer. The Tier I UAS program, Dragon Eye, has flown 8,500 hours in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Tier III 
UAS program, RQ-2 Pioneer has flown over 13,900 combat hours since its inception in 
                                                 
17 John G. Castellaw,  DC Aviation, Fiscal Year 2007 Marine Corps tactical Air Programs, March 
2006. 
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1986. As mentioned earlier, the Marine Corps is filling a capability gap for the Tier II 
UAS with a fee-for-service agreement with Boeing and has two ScanEagle UAS systems 
collocated with the VMU squadrons in OIF and OEF.  
1. RQ-2 Pioneer Unmanned Aerial System 
Developed jointly by AAI Corporation and Israel Aircraft Industries, the RQ-2 
Pioneer has served with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps since 1986. The Pioneer UAV 
System was originally a joint Navy and Marine Corps program. After the Navy decided 
to transition to other UAS programs, all Navy Pioneer systems were transferred to the 
Marine Corps in the late 1990s. Currently, the RQ-2 Pioneer is deployed by the MAGTF 
to provide real-time tactical intelligence services for the battlefield commander. The “R” 
is the Department of Defense designation for reconnaissance; “Q” means unmanned 
aircraft system. The “2” refers to it being the second of a series of purpose-built 
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft systems. (See Table 1) 
The RQ-2 Pioneer System has been providing commanders at all levels with day 
and night, battlefield ISR and target acquisition capabilities in support of Marine 
expeditionary warfare operations. After 21 years of service, the Pioneer has undergone 
numerous upgrades despite its original “interim” status as a program that was intended to 
fill a capability gap in 1986. Over the years, Pioneer has been updated with state of the 
art technology to operate through 2015. Through a planned phase-out, it is expected to be 
replaced by a Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aircraft System (VTUAS). 
Currently, the Pioneer program relies on major sub-systems from the Army’s Shadow 
200 UAV system (i.e., engine, payload, GCS and launcher), and the Hunter UAV system 












Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance craft are designed to conduct 
reconnaissance through photographic and electrical means. 
 
Q Unmanned: An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is any aircraft 
without the capacity for a human pilot. Yet, not merely a missile or 
rocket.  
 




 The program is also in the process of modifying its legacy Ground Control Station 
(GCS) into the One SystemTM GCS currently under development and procurement by 
the U.S. Army. This common operating system will help minimize development costs 
and contribute to the Marine Corps’ concept of interoperability as well as a more 
common approach to inter-service UAS operations with the U.S. Army. This new One 
SystemTM GCS will be scalable, and it will serve as a common GCS for all future Marine 
Corps UAS tier systems. This early investment is expected to produce improved 
readiness, increase flexibility, and availability of systems to the commander in the 
battlefield while reducing the cost and manpower training requirements in different 
systems. It is also regarded as a positive step for the future of all UAS systems in the U.S. 
military because it will integrate UAS capabilities into a more common and interoperable 
environment.18  
                                                 




Figure 6.   One System Ground Control Station (GCS) 
 
a. Mission and Purpose 
The Pioneer UAV system performs a wide variety of reconnaissance, 
intelligence, and special missions. The Pioneer’s primary mission is Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance, Battle Damage Assessment, Search and Rescue, Artillery Targeting and 
Acquisition, Control of Close Air Support and Psychological Operations. It also provides 
real-time intelligence imagery in support of maritime, amphibious, and ground battle 
operations.19 Secondary missions include the development of tactics and operational 
concept, support rear area security, drug interdiction support and Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IED) identification during convoy operations. 
The Pioneer UAV System is capable of operation from conventional 
airfields, unimproved airfields (with a smooth, Foreign Object Damage free surface), and 
six modified L-class ships. Alternative launch methods include pneumatic launch 
(Marine Corps only) ashore, and Rocket Assisted Take-off (RATO) ashore and afloat. 
Recovery methods include conventional and arrested landings ashore, and Shipboard 
Pioneer Arrestment and Recovery System (SPARS) net recoveries aboard ships.  
                                                 
19 MCWP 3-42.1, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations, August 2003.  
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b. System Description 
The RQ-2 Pioneer system consists of five air vehicles, a Ground Control 
Station (GCS), a Tracking Communication Unit (TCU), a Portable Control Station (PCS), 
four Remote Receiving Stations (RRS), pneumatic or rocket assisted launcher and net or 
runway arrestment recovery systems.  The ground control station (GCS-2000) is 
contained in either an S-250 shelter or an S-280 shelter. When installed aboard ship, the 
GCS is housed in a mobile maintenance facility (MMF). The PCS, which does not 
require a shelter, is housed in an S-250 shelter and can be transportable on a HMMWV 
for remote operations. 
 The Pioneer system utilizes a jam-resistant, direct sequence spread 
spectrum up-link command channel (C-band). The video and telemetry down-link, also at 
C-band, utilizes a state-of-the-art high-power solid-state amplifier and directional 
antennas on both the TCU and air vehicle, assuring excellent quality video for the 
commander in the field. An Omni-directional UHF backup link is provided for 
redundancy in this key subsystem. Currently the Pioneer’s payload includes the gyro-
stabilized high-resolution TV or FLIR payloads for day and night or reduced visibility 
operations.  
 Also available for integration and testing is a radio relay payload for VHF 
and UHF frequencies. Recent demonstration programs have successfully integrated 
meteorological sensor, radial sensor, and chemical detection payloads into the Pioneer 
system. Additional payloads are being scheduled for integration and testing on-board the 
Pioneer.20  
                                                 




Figure 7.   RQ-2 Pioneer Profile 
 
 
c. General Characteristics 
The RQ-2 Pioneer is a product of Pioneer UAVs Incorporated; Israel 
Aircraft Industries.  The RQ-2A Power Plant is a Sachs 2-stroke crankcase-scavenged 2-
cylinder horizontally-opposed, simultaneously firing engine (26hp). The RQ-2B Power 
Plant is a UEL AR-741 Wankel engine 28.3 kW (38 hp). The RQ-2 Pioneer 













Table 2.   RQ-2 Pioneer Specifications Table 
 
WEIGHT Empty                             276 lb  
Fuel Capacity                  65 lb  
Sensor Payload (max)     75 lb  
Max Takeoff Wt             416 lb  
DIMENSIONS Wing Span                      17 ft 1 in  
Fuselage Length              9 ft 7 in  
Fuselage Width               1 ft 4 in  
Wheel Base                     5 ft 6 in  
Propeller Diameter          2 ft 5 in  
Length                             13 ft 8 in  
Wing Area                       30.1 sq ft  
PROPULSION Pusher-propeller driven two-stroke,  twin-
cylinder, rear-mounted engine. Max Power 
29 hp 
PERFORMANCE Fuel capacity                   12.9 gallons  of 
100 octane AVGAS 
Radius                             114 mi (100 nm) 
Endurance                        5 hrs  
Altitude                           15,000 ft  
Max Endurance               59.0 mph  (65 kts) 
Loiter Speed                    59.0 mph  (65 kts) 
Cruise Speed                   74.5 mph ( 85 kts) 
Maximum Speed             109.4 mph (110 
kts) 
Radius of Action 
     nominal                      99.4 mi ( 87 nm)  
     maximum                   114.0 mi (101 nm)  
 
d. Capabilities 
The Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system provides real-time 
intelligence and reconnaissance capability to the field commander. This highly mobile 
system provides high quality video imagery for artillery, battle damage assessment and 
reconnaissance over land or sea. Strategic or tactically vital data may be obtained cost-
effectively by exploiting the UAV’s low radar cross section, low IR signature, and 
remote control versatility.  
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The Air vehicle relays video and/or telemetry information from its payload 
to the ground control station (GCS) and/or portable control station (PCS) in real time. 
More than one control station may be used to either increase the UAV’s effective range 
or to control more than one UAV.  
e. Manpower Requirements 
A detailed summary of the manpower structure of the VMU to operate the 
RQ-2 Pioneer is shown in Appendix A.  This structure is the result of decades of 
continuous evolution through trial and error and through some research and development 
from the aviation sponsor where it currently resides. After over 20 years of operating the 
RQ-2 Pioneer and with the current operating tempo, the VMUs are faced with the 
challenge of meeting a 21st century mission with an outdated and underdeveloped 
manpower structure. Their ability to meet mission is remarkable and worthy of praise, but 
this does not mean that they are capable of maintaining this record for the long term. It is 
imperative that the VMU of the future develops a scalable, flexible and knowledgeable 
manpower structure to ensure its survivability through 2030 and beyond. 
2. ScanEagle™ Unmanned Aerial System 
ScanEagle is a low-cost, long-endurance UAV built by Boeing and Insitu. 
ScanEagle is a descendant of another Insitu UAV, SeaScan, which was conceived of as a 
remote sensor for collecting weather data as well as helping commercial fishermen locate 
and track schools of tuna. ScanEagle emerged as the result of a strategic alliance between 
Boeing and Insitu. The resulting technology has been successful as a portable Unmanned 
Aerial System (UAS) for autonomous surveillance in the battlefield, and has been 
deployed since August 2004 in the Iraq War. 
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Figure 8.   ScanEagle on the Pneumatic Launch System (PLS) 
 
 
a. Mission and Purpose 
ScanEagle is not a POR and therefore does not have a specified mission 
that can be researched from military documents. Its role, similar to Pioneer, is to perform 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Battle Damage Assessment, Search and Rescue, 
Artillery Targeting and Acquisition, Control of Close Air Support and Psychological 
Operations as directed by military commanders. 
b. System Description 
ScanEagle is not a program of record but fills an identified capability gap, 
and is filling the Tier II role in the Marine Corps’ three tier UAS FoS concept of 
employment.  The Marine Corps is developing requirements for a UAS to support 
regimental and Marine Expeditionary Unit operations. This Tier II UAS will be smaller 
in size than the Tier III Pioneer but bigger than the Tier I UAS, the Dragon Eye.  
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c. General Characteristics 
 
 Payload 13.2 lb / 6 kg  
 Endurance 15 hours  
 Service Ceiling 16400 ft / 5000 m  
 Max Level Speed 70 knots / 36 m/s  
 Cruise Speed 49 knots / 25 m/s  
 Wing Span  10.2 ft / 3.1 m  
 Fuselage Diameter 7.0 in / 0.2 m  
 Length 3.9 ft / 1.2 m  
Camera Range 100+ km  
Max Takeoff Weight 37.9 lb / 18 kg 
 
d. Capabilities 
ScanEagle carries an inertially stabilized electro-optical and/or infrared 
camera on a lightweight inertially stabilized turret system integrated with a 
communications range over 100 km, and flight endurance of 20+ hours. ScanEagle has a 
10-foot wingspan and can fly up to 75 knots. The block D aircraft features a higher 
resolution camera, a custom-designed Mode C transponder and a new video system.21  
ScanEagle needs no airfield to deploy; it is launched and recovered using 
Insitu's patented SuperWedge launcher and SkyHook retrieval system which uses a rope 
hanging from a 50-foot pole. Not requiring a runway and being crosswind independent 
makes the ScanEagle UAV an ideal solution for both sea and land-based operations. 
                                                 
21 Wikipedia.com. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scan_Eagle. Accessed April 2007. 
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e. Manpower Structure 
Since ScanEagle is not a POR and it is a fee-for-service contract, no 
military manpower requirements structure currently exists. The system is operated and 
maintained by Insitu and Boeing Corporation. The Marine Corps is currently researching 
the development of this manpower structure. This thesis is part of the research and 
Chapter IV proposes a manpower structure to satisfy the immediate requirement to fill 
this gap.  
3. Dragon Eye Unmanned Aerial System (Micro UAS) 
In 2003, the Marine Corps adopted the Dragon Eye UAV, the smallest 
functioning unmanned aerial vehicle, in an effort to minimize friendly casualties and 
maximize pre-movement surveillance. The Dragon Eye UAV is specifically designed to 
follow a predetermined mission into questionable areas to deliver a bird's eye view of its 
surroundings with two, near-real-time video cameras.  
Initial experimentation occurred during the Kernel Blitz Experiment with 3rd 
Battalion, 5th Marines in June 2001, providing operating forces an early opportunity to 
gain familiarization with the small UAV concept; develop tactics, techniques and 
procedures; and identify potential doctrine, organization and training issues. 
The Dragon Eye (DE) Interim-Small Unit Remote Scouting System (I-SURSS) 
was developed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, VA., as a 
small, fully autonomous, back-able, hand launched UAV to provide the Marine Corps an 
“over-the-next-hill, or building” tactical reconnaissance and surveillance capability. 
Dragon Eye began fielding in June 2004, after a successful 10-system demonstration with 
the 1st Marine Division serving in Iraq. Currently, over 40 percent of the Dragon Eye 
inventory (171 air vehicles and 57 Ground Control Stations are serving in OIF and OEF.  
As of January 2005, the Dragon Eye had been in production for three years, with the 
Marine Corps having fielded it in two. The Dragon Eye system was also expected to be 





Figure 9.   Dragon Eye Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System 
 
 
a. Mission and Purpose 
Dragon Eye's primary mission is reconnaissance and surveillance for small 
unit commanders, across the battlefield functions, with an organic capability to see over 
the next hill/building, or conduct route reconnaissance, battle damage assessment, and 
unit force protection. The autopilot must provide fully autonomous operation, GPS 
navigation, air vehicle stability for imagery, preprogrammed search patterns, in-flight 
waypoint updates, and interface protocol with the GCS software and payload sensors.  
The Dragon Eye aircraft is used primarily for scouting urban areas, and is 
especially useful in urban assaults. Its camera, when used with a trained Marine, spots the 
enemy without alerting them to the UAV's presence. Launched using a store-bought 
bungee cord, it is easy to get aloft and becomes useful quickly. It also uses a break-apart 
system to increase durability — parts of the plane break apart instead of shattering and 
can be reattached later or replaced with new parts. 
b. System Description 
A Dragon Eye system consists of two air vehicles, four cameras, two 
replacement noses and one ground control station. The Dragon Eye UAV is battery-
operated and capable of fully autonomous flight. Made of lightweight material, it is 
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designed to disassemble into five separate pieces and is intended to be carried in an 
individual Marine’s pack. Dragon Eye is made of lightweight Styrofoam-like materials. 
Dragon Eye has a 45-inch wingspan once assembled and weighs about five pounds. 
Missions are programmed via a wireless modem that is integrated into a twelve-pound 
ground control station. After being hand- or bungee cord-launched, Dragon Eye flies to 
pre-assigned GPS waypoints and has the ability to be reprogrammed in flight. Its sensors 
include full motion color, low light and infrared cameras, each capable of transmitting 
video line-of-sight to a range of ten kilometers. 
This UAV can reach speeds of 35 miles-per-hour, altitudes of 1,000 feet, 
distances of 10 kilometers, and has a battery endurance of one hour. Dragon Eye’s twin 
electric engines run quietly on battery power. It is flown autonomously at an altitude of 
150m'. The total weight of the Dragon Eye is five pounds including the one-pound 
payload (camera and equipment). The mission is programmed on the control station and 
transmitted to the UAV via wireless modem. After launch by a bungee cord or by hand, it 
climbs to the cruise altitude and sweeps through the pre-assigned waypoints, navigating 
via GPS. The fuselage-mounted, side-looking sensor consists of a low-light black and 
white (b/w) camera capable of transmitting live video to the ground station from a 
distance of 10 km via line-of-sight video data-link. Operator’s training requires less than 
one week to complete the course of instruction and learn to execute its capabilities. 
The aircraft is programmed via a seven-pound, rugged-sized handheld 
computer that is capable of flight planning, flight monitoring, and storage of air vehicle 
transmitted video. The aircraft’s flight profile is GPS waypoint guided, each waypoint 
allowing for various linear, and orbiting search patterns and altitudes. Missions are 
programmed via a wireless modem that is integrated into a small, lightweight ground 
control station. After bungee launch, Dragon Eye flies to pre-assigned GPS waypoints but 
the aircraft’s flight profile has the ability to be reprogrammed in flight.  
The operator uses a wearable ground control station with a computer 
processor and a map display that is located on the forearm or vest attachment. Clicking 
on the moving map display tells the UAV how high and where to fly, including desired 
return time. A video stream comes back to a monitor contained in the wearable ground 
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station. Lithium batteries allow for 60 minutes of flight time at a speed of about 45 mph. 
It has about a 10-kilometer range, and could, theoretically, be passed from one Marine to 
the next to extend this range if batteries are replaced.  
The GCS is a computerized system that controls and operates the aircraft 
from the ground by means of a touch screen. A laptop computer with wireless satellite 
connections sends signals to the aircraft. The operator views video through goggles 
connected to the GCS. There are three interchangeable nose cameras including one for 
low-light situations such as dusk and dawn, one for regular daylight and an infrared nose 
used for night launches. One camera is mounted inside the nose of the plane and a second 
is located on the left side. While the nose camera can move any direction, the left camera 
can only point in the direction of flight or straight forward, but delivers an eight-digit grid 
at the center point of the video. Its small size and aerodynamic design make it a hard 
target for adversaries.  
c. General Characteristics 
The propeller-driven Dragon Eye comes packed with a video camera. It is 
assembled and launched by a two-man team in approximately 10 minutes though possibly 
less than five minutes, and comes complete with a portable control station. Dragon Eye 
weighs approximately six pounds fully assembled and has a wingspan of three feet. Its 
maximum endurance rate is approximately 60 minutes, but 45 minutes is nominal. 
Dragon Eye’s operating altitude is between 300 and 500 feet above ground level, with a 









LENGTH: 0.9 M (3 FT) 
Wingspan: 1.1m (3.75 ft) 
Ceiling: 90 to 150 m (300-500 ft) 
Weight: 2.3 kg (5.1 lb) 
Cruising speed: 65 km/h (40 mph) 
Battery Endurance: 1 hour 
Range: 5 km (3.1 mi) 
Transmission Range: 10 km (6.2 mi) 
GCS 6 kg 
 
d. Capabilities 
Dragon Eye possesses real-time high resolution day color and low light 
black/white imaging. It has two electric motors that provide extremely low noise 
signature and its small wingspan makes it hard to detect.  Its sensors include full motion 
color, low light, and in the future other sensors such as infrared cameras in 
interchangeable payload noses. The system is capable of transmitting sensor and air 
vehicle telemetry data line-of-sight (LOS) to a range of ten kilometers. Dragon Eye flies 
up to speeds of 35 mph. The system is based on an evolutionary acquisition strategy 
which plans performance improvements in future block upgrades. The autopilot must 
weigh less than four ounces.    
e. Manpower Requirements 
Proper operation of the system takes a two-man team: one to assemble the 
aircraft and one to get the ground control station up and running. Both are capable of 
operating the vehicle and perform the required maintenance to keep the UAV in action. 
Since this is an organic asset to the infantry battalion, commanders usually assign 
Marines on the basis of availability and skills that resemble the operations of these small 
assets. There is no specific pre-requisite to how Marines are selected to fill this 
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manpower billet, yet once they are selected; their knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) 
are developed through extensive and consistent hands on training and operational 
experience.  
C. FUTURE MARINE CORPS UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
1. RQ-7 Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial System 
Unlike the Pioneer, this UAV system is launched from a rail. It is recovered with 
the aid of arresting gear similar to jets on an aircraft carrier. Currently, this system is 
operated by the U.S. Army, but the Marine Corps is planning to transition from the RQ-2 
Pioneer to the Shadow 200 by 2015. The Army's Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training 
Battalion at Fort Huachuca, AZ trains soldiers and civilians in the operation and 
maintenance of the Shadow UAV. Concurrently, the Marine Corps is researching efforts 
to develop its training in coordination with the Army at Fort Huachuca. The MCWL is 
performing tests and operational developments with a concept demonstrator to facilitate 
the transition.22 
The RQ-7 Shadow is the result of the U.S. Army’s continuous search for an 
effective battlefield UAV after the cancellation of the RQ-6 Outrider UAS.  The Army 
requirement specified a UAV that used a gasoline engine, could carry an electro-
optic/infrared imaging sensor turret, and had a minimum range of 31 miles (50 
kilometers) with four hour endurance on station.23 The Shadow 200 offered at least twice 
that range, powered by a 38 hp (28.5 kW) rotary engine. The Army also mandated that 
the UAS be capable of landing in an area the size of a soccer field. 
In the recent past, MCCDC and MCSC have been examining plans to compare 
and select a more compatible UAV system that meets the requirements of their tiers II 
and III requirements. The Shadow UAV has proven to be more cost effective and flexible 
                                                 
22 David A. Funkhouser, (Capt USMC). MCWL Concept Demonstrator Tier II. Personal email 
interview. February 2007. 
23 Wikipedia.com. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RQ-7_Shadow.  Accessed on February 2007. 
 38
than the current Pioneer. At half the cost and with similar capabilities than the Pioneer, 
the transition was one that made sense for all entities involved.  
 
 
Figure 10.   RQ-7 Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial System 
 
a. Mission and Purpose 
This Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) system is designed as a 
ground maneuver asset. It is the commander's primary day/night reconnaissance, 
surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment system.  
b. System Description 
The RQ-7 Shadow system includes four aircraft, two ground stations, a 
launch trailer, and support vehicles for equipment and personnel.  The Shadow 200 is a 
small, lightweight, tactical UAS. The system comprises four air vehicles, modular 
mission payloads, ground control stations, launch and recovery equipment, and 
communications equipment. It will carry enough supplies and spares for an initial 72 
hours of operation. It will be transported by means of two high mobility multi-purpose 
wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) with shelters, and two additional HMMWVs with trailers 
as troop carriers.24 
 
 
                                                 
24 Global Security.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/shadow.htm. Accessed April 
2007.  
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c. General Characteristics 
While a single UAS system includes three Shadow 200 air vehicles, a 
forth air vehicle is included as part of the issued equipment of the maintenance section. 
The air vehicle is constructed of composite materials, with a wingspan of 12.3 feet, and 
length of 11.2 feet. Power is provided by a commercial 38-horsepower rotary engine that 
uses motor gasoline (MOGAS). The payload has two commercially available electro-
optic and infrared cameras for command and control and imagery dissemination, 
communication equipment and an onboard global positioning system (GPS) to provide 
navigation information.25 
 
Payload POP-200/300 27 kg (60 lb) 
Length 3.4 m (11.2 ft) 
Wingspan 3.9 m (12.8 ft) 
Height 1 m 
Weight 375 lb (154 kg) fueled and oiled 
Fuel capacity 44 L of 87 octane gasoline, also 
capable of 100LL Avgas (with few 
modifications) 
Power plant Wankel UAV Engines 741 
Speed normal operating range 60 to 110 
knots (110 to 200 km/h) 
Ceiling 15,000 ft (4,600 m) MSL 
Maximum 
endurance 
4 hours (6 hours for RQ-7B) 
Range 50 km (27 nautical miles) with a 
single GCS and up to 125 km with a 




                                                 
25 OSD. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap. 2005-2030. p. 8. 
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d. Capabilities 
The Shadow 200 can provide up to four hours of air time endurance with a 
maximum range of 125 kilometers (limited by data link capability). It typically operates 
between 8,000 to 10,000 feet above ground level during the day and 6,000 to 8,000 feet at 
night. The air vehicle uses a pneumatic launcher and is recovered by a tactical automatic 
landing system without pilot intervention on the runway. Landing is performed 
automatically in day or night using a portable tracking system, an airborne transponder 
and arresting cable system.  Its liquid nitrogen cooled gimbal and digitally stabilized 
electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) camera relays video in real time via a C-band LOS data 
link to the ground control station (GCS).  The Shadow 200 can be launched over a 
distance of 10 meters, and in crosswinds as strong as 20 knots. The entire Shadow unit is 
transportable by means of three C-130 aircraft. 
e. Manpower Requirements 
The U.S. Army’s Shadow 200 systems uses two-man teams at the ground 
control system, an air vehicle operator who flies the UAV and a mission payload operator 
who controls the camera and other sensors.26  This manpower requirement is based on the 
Army’s UAS concept of employment and it is currently being studied by the MCWL at 
Quantico, Virginia. The Marine Corps will most likely adapt from the Army’s lessons 
learned and develop its own manpower requirements from this basic structure. The intent 
is to reduce the manpower requirements and minimize the need for further development 
by simply adopting the system in its current status. 
2. RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial System 
Weighing in at four and a half pounds with a five-foot wingspan and stretching a 
mere 38 inches in length, the RQ-11 Raven is one of the smallest UAVs currently used 
by the U.S. Army. Yet, its aerial reconnaissance value has quickly earned the respect of 
small unit commanders in Iraq and has filled a niche at the battalion level where larger 
                                                 
26 Harding S. UAV University. Soldiers, 58 (2) 4-9. 2003. 
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UAVs were unavailable. Though not as large or capable as some tactical UAVs, the RQ-
11 Raven provides units with a substantial live-coverage capability previously available 
only at higher levels of command.  
The RQ-11 Raven is used by the US Army, USSOCOM, and recently, the Marine 
Corps. As of early 2007, over 5,000 airframes have been shipped, making it the most 
prolific UAV system in the world today. Additionally, U.S. allies have also begun 
acquiring it, e.g., Australia, Italy, and Denmark, with more countries expected over the 




Figure 11.   RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial System  
 
 
 What makes this UAS more attractive to the USMC than its cousin the Dragon 
Eye, is that it is lighter, more maneuverable, has more air endurance, and though a foot 
longer than Dragon Eye - with a six inch longer wing span, its range is more than five 
nautical miles.  
a. Mission and Purpose 
Like Dragon Eye, the RQ-11 Raven’s primary mission, once incorporated 





commanders, across the battlefield functions, with an organic capability to see over the 
next hill/building, or conduct route reconnaissance, battle damage assessment, and unit 
force protection. 
b. System Description 
The RQ-11 Raven is propeller driven and back-packable.  The operation 
of the RQ-11 Raven system is effectively identical to the Pointer UAS, making transition 
to the new smaller system particularly easy. The RQ-11 Raven UAV weighs about 1.9 kg 
(4.2 lb), has a flight endurance of 80 minutes and an effective operational radius of about 
10 km (6.2 miles). Flying speed is 45-95 km/h (28-60 mph) at typical operating altitude 
between 30 m and 300 m (100-1000 ft). The RQ-11 Raven can be either remotely 
controlled from the ground station or fly completely autonomous missions using GPS 
waypoint navigation. 
c. General Characteristics 
Wing Span 4 ft 3 in  
Length 3 ft 7 in  
Height  
Weight 4.2 lb  
Engine Aveox 27/26/7-AV electric motor  
Maximum speed  
Cruising speed 60 mph  
Range 6.2 miles  
Service Ceiling 15000 ft  
Flight Time 60-80 Minutes  
No. in Inventory ~ 1300  
Payloads Interchangeable: optical, infrared, 
and IR cameras  
 
d. Capabilities 
The RQ-11 Raven provides a number of capabilities to the small unit 
commander, namely, a real-time, up-to-date, over the horizon view of any trouble spots. 
It also allows units to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of 
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danger zones.  The Raven has about 45 to 60 minutes of flight time on a battery. The 
UAS is equipped with spare batteries and a charger that plugs into a HMMWV. This 
allows the operator to land it, replace the battery and get it back in the air within minutes.  
The Raven has three different cameras that attach to the nose of the plane, 
an electrical optical camera that sends data either through a nose camera or a side camera, 
an infrared camera in the nose, and a side-mounted IR camera.  With a moderate 
operational range, the Raven provides up-to-the minute intelligence over the target area. 
Day and night, live video capabilities let the Raven greatly assist with the overall 
situation awareness picture. The Raven can fly automatically, navigating using GPS 
technology and programmable routes and target areas, or be remotely flown by the 
operator when necessary.  
The RQ-11 Raven can land itself by auto-pilot to a near-hover speed until 
it drops to the ground. This means there is no requirement for a landing gear or carefully 
prepared landing strips. Since it is launched and recovered in this manner, it does not 
require elaborate support or maintenance facilities. 
e. Manpower Structure 
Its automated features and GPS technology make this UAS simple to 
operate, requiring no especially skilled operators or in-depth flight training.  Proper 
operation of the system takes a two-man team - one to assemble the aircraft and one to 
get the ground control station up and running.  The Marine Corps is expected to adopt the 
same manpower structure since the Dragon Eye and RQ-11 Raven are virtually similar to 
operate.   
D. LONG-RANGE MARINE CORPS UAS PROGRAM 
1. Tier III Developments 
Currently, the Marine Corps does not have a true Tier III asset that meets the 
capability requirements stipulated in their future UAS FoS plans. The intent is to replace 
the RQ-2 Pioneer with a Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aircraft System 
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(VTUAS). This system will provide responsive, real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, 
intelligence, targeting, and weapons employment capability that is organic to the 
MAGTF and the Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders.27  
It will have the key attributes necessary to support (EMW), including vertical 
takeoff and landing from all air capable ships/austere land bases, the speed to be 
responsive and tactically agile, and the survivability required to effectively operate in 
denied access environments. In search for a replacement for its aging RQ-2 Pioneer 
system, the Marine Corps is interested in finding a capable and versatile VTUAS 
platform to transition its Tier III asset starting in 2015.   
The control and ownership of this asset will rest with the Marine Expeditionary 
Force (MEF) and Joint Task Force (JTF) level commands. The development of this 
VTAUS system is the primary focus of capability teams at (MCSC, MCCDC and MCWL 
respectively).  Though there is no official documentation to corroborate what asset will 
become the first VTUAS. Bell Helicopter’s Eagle Eye tilt rotor UAS, which is the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s planned procurement program, seems to meet the capability requirements 
concept for the Marine Corps for the Tier III UAS FoS Strategy articulated by 
MCCDC.28 
  
                                                 
27 John G. Castellaw,  DC Aviation, Fiscal Year 2007 marine Corps tactical Air Programs, March 
2006. 
28 J. Mullin, Lt Col (USMC), UAS Material Capability Officer, MCCDC. USMC UAS FoS Vision 




Figure 12.   Eagle Eye Unmanned Aerial System 
Source: From AHS international 
 
 
2. Tier II Developments 
The Marine Corps is currently testing a Tier II UAS asset to replace the 
ScanEagle fee-for-service contract with Boeing Corp.  The Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL) at Quantico, VA, will use a proposed UAS as a Concept 
Demonstrator (CD) — a single system with a GCS and multiple vehicles – to serve as the 
test-bed to develop operating concepts and tactics, techniques and procedure, as a means 
to flesh out performance requirements for the future Tier II UAS.29  The Shadow 200 is 
being evaluated to fulfill this role. In the testing, the CD must be capable of operational 
speeds of 40-60 knots, up to 10 hours of flight endurance, and operations at altitudes up 
to 15,000 feet, but with a typical mission altitude of 1,500–3,000 feet.30 
 
 
                                                 
29 David A. Funkhouser, (Capt USMC). MCWL Concept Demonstrator Tier II. Personal email 
interview. February 2007. 
30 J. Mullin, Lt Col (USMC), UAS Material Capability Officer, MCCDC. USMC UAS FoS Vision 
Brief. November 2005. Slide 16. 
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3. Tier I Developments 
The Marine Corps’ micro UAS field is primed for a new wave of technology 
advances that will improve the Tier I. it includes one of the latest developments in the 
military UAS arena — the proliferation of small, hand-launched, fixed wing UAVs. 
Currently, the Marine Corps’ Dragon Eye has been effective in its mission for the low-
level unit commander, providing aerial observation over the next hill/building, ahead of 
convoys or a few blocks away in cities without endangering troops.   
In the future, as the air ways become increasingly clogged with UAS, this micro 
UAS technology will become the norm for higher operational support.  Consequently, the 
MCWL is experimenting with a “flying wing” micro-UAS called The Wasp. Developed 
by the same company who created Dragon Eye and the RQ-11 Raven, it is being funded 
by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and supported by the 









                                                 
31 G. Elhers, Maj (USMC), Navy League website, www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jul06-18.php. 
Accessed April 2007. 
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Launched with a flick of the wrist, the Wasp weighs six ounces and has a 13-inch 
wingspan.  It carries tiny forward- and side-looking color daylight video cameras. It flew 
for an hour and 47 minutes during initial tests in 2002, and could eventually become a 
Sub-Tier I UAV for Marine squads and platoons.   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps UAS FoS program has come a long way from its origins on 
1986.  Since the first UAS (RQ-2 Pioneer) was flown by U.S. Marines, the technology of 
these systems has advanced tremendously.  While the systems have become more 
autonomous and more flexible to meet the warfighter’s needs, the manpower 
requirements have been adapting to catch up to the capabilities developed for each 
system.  These manpower requirements should become part of the program of record so 
as to be more realistic in the assessment of future program developments in this field. 
This chapter highlights the evolution and level of sophistication the Marine Corps 
has achieved as a “Force in Readiness”.  Throughout the Marine Corps’s history with 
UAS platforms, there has been substantial development in capabilities but little progress 
in the development of a systematic and realistic manpower structure to plan for and 
support mission needs and growing technological requirements, including schools and 
promotion criteria.  This chapter illuminates a shortfall in the prospect for advanced 
research in the manpower requirements that are needed to develop a functional, capable 
and scalable force to operate and maintain these systems.  This research produces a 
template for the development of a manpower structure based on where the program has 
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IV. PROPOSED UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (TIER II/III) 
MANPOWER STRUCTURE 
A. THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPING A MANPOWER STRUCTURE 
The Marine Corps UAS community has two active duty VMUs.  The unit’s T/O 
identifies the current USMC UAS manpower structures. The evolution and development 
of their early manpower structures are an outgrowth of the requirements for the RQ-2 
Pioneer. The T/O&E for one of these squadrons is shown in Appendix A.  
Since 1986, when the first Pioneer was flown, the Marine Corps has been 
analyzing its manpower requirements to fulfill the growing demand for UAS capabilities 
in the battlefield.  Currently, neither VMU-1 nor VMU-2 has enough qualified personnel 
to meet the ever growing demand for UAS assets. The mission requirements for these 
two VMUs have grown exponentially with the ongoing operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
The pervasive conflict that emerges in many MOS fields, including the UAS 
community when a capability is developed without the proper steps in the acquisition 
process, is that the manpower billets are filled using originally established requirements. 
In 1986, the original intent of the RQ-2 Pioneer was to fill a capability gap as an 
“interim” program. Now, 21 years later, the VMU has evolved to become the model for 
the manpower structure for future UAS in the Marine Corps.  
In a report by the Government Accounting Organization (GAO) published in 
March of 2004, the committee cites the importance of integrating the capability with the 
force structure: 
DoD’s approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not 
provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate 
their integration into the force structure efficiently, although DoD has 
taken certain positive steps to improve the UAV program’s 
management.32 
                                                 
32 Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
Efforts. General Accounting Office Report GAO 04-342. March 2004. 
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 The evident challenge in the development of a robust, flexible and scalable UAS 
manpower structure is to break the adaptation cycle. The DoD’s Unmanned Aerial Systems 
Roadmap 2005–2030 or other defense planning documents discuss a comprehensive strategic 
plan to ensure that the services and DoD agencies focus on the integration of the systems with the 
manpower requirements.  The future manpower structure for the UAS program must be 
developed in accordance with the requirements stated in the Concept of Operations and 
employment for the Marine Corps Vision for the UAS program.33 The traditional 
approach to manpower development is to choose a system that meets the stated capability 
requirement or to replace an aging system with a new system. Among the choices of 
systems available, Marine Corps planners determine which new specific vehicle/system 
most closely meets the requirements at the lowest cost, while providing maximum stated 
capabilities.   
Marine Corps planners consistently strive to optimize resources to meet capability 
requirements, by looking at Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) alternatives and Non-
Developmental Items (NDI) to save time and money. Unfortunately, this is not always 
the best approach. If COTS or NDI alternatives cannot meet the requirements, then other 
approaches, consistent with the acquisition process, are selected, which include the 
research and development of a completely new system.  This is a more costly and time 
consuming approach. It is also an approach that can kill a program if funding must be 
diverted mid-stream for other critical programs.  Once a system is selected, the process of 
operational development and testing begins and a set of Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTP) are developed through a Concept Demonstrator (CD) prior to the full 
acquisition and fielding on the new system.  
In theory, the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) which reviews all these aspects 
of acquisition should highlight the importance of the manpower concept of operations 
(ConOps) as a key factor in the development of any system.  Many times, the process of 
manning is a secondary issue or an after-thought that becomes more relevant once the 
capability has been selected or developed, rather than integrated as part of the original 
concept design.  In practice, it is important to state that Marine Corps planners estimate 
                                                 
33 J. Mullin, Lt Col (USMC), UAS Material Capability Officer, MCCDC, USMC VISION. UAV 
Family of Systems (FoS) Document. September 2005. 
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risks and determine priorities based on mission needs and other relevant factors to the 
acquisition process, but the integration of all agencies is not always possible. For this 
reason, sometimes, the manpower ConOps is not considered in the original set of 
priorities but as an Appendix to the capability development. If this were accomplished in 
a more integrated process, the Manpower Concept of Operations would be considered a 
top priority, and the manpower requirements would be determined based on this concept 
of operations. Manpower drivers must be integrated into the development of capability 
and resources to produce a system that meets the needs of the Marine Corps and will not 
cause a force shaping dilemma in the Total Force Structure for manpower planners.  
This chapter will analyze this integrated development process so that future UAS 
manpower requirements may be considered in the initial development of the capability. 
The goal is to create a Marine Composite Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMUX) 
to merge the Tier II and III capabilities into one robust, flexible and scalable UAS unit.  
This would provide each level of the MAGTF an organic, interoperable, integrated and 
tailored capability that gives situational awareness to the warfighter through a common 
C2 architecture across a range of military operations.34   
B.  CURRENT VMU ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1. VMU Manpower Structure 
The VMU is the only officially developed manpower structure in the USMC UAS 
community.  It has been developed over the years through the growing pains and 
experiences from the original concept of employment back in 1986 with the 10th Marine 
Artillery Regiment’s Target Acquisition Battery, Detachment Alpha. Since then, the 
VMU has been adapting to the growing need of field commanders for this unique and 
limited asset.  The squadron is organized much like any other manned squadrons in the 
Marine Corps with the following departments:35 
                                                 
34 J. Mullin, Lt Col (USMC), UAS Material Capability Officer, MCCDC, USMC VISION. UAV 
Family of Systems (FoS) Document. September 2005. 
35 Marine Unmanned Vehicle Squadron (VMU) Organizational Structure Presentation. MAWTS-1, 
UAS Division. March 2007. Slide 16. 
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a) HQ Section.  This is the Command and control section of the unit and it is 
where the Commanding Officer (CO) and his cell reside.  It is the CO who promulgates 
and delegates the authority for the conduct and execution of all functions of the VMU. 
b) Administration Department (S-1).  Like every Marine Corps unit, the VMU 
has an Administration Department that handles day-to-day administrative functions such 
as record keeping, correspondence, legal matters, and other relevant personnel functions. 
c) Intelligence Department (S-2).  The VMU has a robust intelligence 
department which includes several Air Intelligence (AI) Officers, Intelligence Analysts 
(IA), and Imagery Analysts (IA), who process the intelligence collected by the UAS and 
coordinate intelligence collection with other intelligence units and agencies. 
d) Operations Department (S-3).  The operations department is staffed with 
several officers from aviation or aviation command and control backgrounds who serve 
as UAV Mission Commanders (MC); as well as enlisted Marines who serve as UAV 
external pilots (EP), internal pilots (IP), and payload operators (PO). 
e) Logistics Department (S-4).  This department operates and maintains the 
squadron’s rolling stock and support equipment. It also manages the squadron’s supply 
and accounting systems and it is responsible for the effective and efficient operation of 
the unit’s armory. 
f) Communications Department (S-6).  The communications department 
operates and maintains the squadron’s vast array of communications and data equipment 
used to communicate with the supported unit and aviation command and control agencies 
throughout the Battlespace. 
g) Aviation Maintenance Department (AMT).  The  Aviation Maintenance 
Department not only maintains the squadron’s stable of UAVs, but also maintains all of 
the UAV system’s associated equipment such as the Ground Control Station (GCS), 
Portable Control Station (PCS), Pneumatic Launch Vehicle (PLV), Rocket-Assisted 
Take-Off (RATO) equipment, and UAV recovery equipment. 
h) Department of Safety and Standardization (DOSS).  Just like all manned-
aviation squadrons in the Navy and Marine Corps, the VMU has a Department of Safety 
and Standardization that is responsible for managing the squadron’s overall safety effort 
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and ensuring that the squadron operates in accordance with the Naval Aviation Training 
and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) program. 
i) Medical Department.  This small department is charged with proving all the 
medical support for the unit.  It is comprised of a flight surgeon and three corpsmen.  
The focus of this research concentrates on the development of the manpower 
requirements currently imbedded in the S-3 and Aviation Maintenance Department 
(AMT) departments. These departments contain all of the MOS billets required to operate 
and maintain the UAS platforms. Following the development of a robust, flexible and 
scalable manpower structure, this research will analyze how an integrated approach to 
optimize the operational, maintenance and logistical support structures would maximize 
the capabilities of the system and improve manpower assignment of billets in each 
VMUX.  
C. CONCEPTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANPOWER 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VMUX 
1. Concept of Operations 
The creation of a new, composite VMU (VMUX) will be a radical departure of 
current doctrinal practices within the USMC in the UAS Community.  This new UAS 
unit will continue to be operated, predominantly, by enlisted Marines, and a hand full of 
officers assigned as Mission Commanders (MC).  This will require the development of a 
training plan that will develop Marines from each Tier to be selected to move up to 
higher tiers after certification and completion of specific requirements.  The ConOps 
should enable the VMUX units to deploy in detachments of capability sets to support 
field commanders at different levels of the MAGTF.  These units will be required to 
operate afloat and ashore in a variety of missions that range from MOOTW to combat 
operations in every corner of the globe. These systems will be combined to form 
capability sets to support protracted operations or to deploy ahead of the Friendly Line of 
Troops (FLOT) to provide intelligence, target acquisition, reconnaissance, surveillance, 
and other missions as required by the MAGTF and JTF commanders.   
 54
According to USMC authorities, the systems must be capable of providing at least 
12 hours of continuous on-station support at a range of up to 110 nautical miles (NM) 
within a 24-hour period.  The capability for 24-hours of continuous on-station support 
can be scaled when the systems are deployed in sets of two or more to support different 
MAGTF elements (e.g. MEF, MEB, and MEU).  The GCS will be replaced with the new 
One SystemTM GCS. This system is scalable, and will serve as a common GCS for all 
future Marine Corps UAS tier systems to allow UAS personnel to perform detailed route 
and payload planning and mission execution.  The VMUX units will not only be required 
to perform missions afloat and ashore but also be able to conduct ship-to-ship, split ship-
to-shore and split shore operations with the use of the PCS and Remote Receiving Station 
(RRS).  Their enhanced capabilities will allow VMUX detachments to locate and identify 
major enemy forces, moving vehicles, and weapons that are firing on ground and air 
units, and other targets of interest as determined by the controlling activity.  
 In addition, the VMUX will conduct counter-mobility operations, provide security 
for rear area forces, and perform other such air operations as assigned by the MAGTF 
Commander. In accordance with the Navy Training Systems Plan (NTSP) for the Vertical 
Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (VTUAS), there will be three 
concepts of employment in support of the MEU:  
The first has AVs launched, recovered, and maintained aboard the 
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) with MMP operators residing onboard 
the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) command ships. The second concept 
is also launched from the LPD with operations handed off to a HMMWV-
mounted GCS ashore. This method of operation may require that 
detachment personnel be split between three locations: the ARG command 
ship, the LPD, and the shore component. The third option is limited 
operations ashore. This has the bulk of the detachment moving ashore to 
support operations, leaving a liaison aboard the ARG command ship for 
mission coordination. In this option, it may be necessary to split the 
maintenance personnel between the shore site and the LPD.36  
 The composition of each VMUX detachment should be flexible and light for 
embarkation and conform to the expeditionary nature of the USMC.  The VMUX 
                                                 
36 NAVAIR.  Navy Training System Plan for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle. N-75-NTSP-A-50-0004/D. June 2001. p. 8.  
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detachment should be capable of rapidly integrating with elements of the MAGTF on 
short notice and deploy on board amphibious ships or military aircrafts with all of its 
assets.  Therefore, it is imperative that deployment work-ups and short notice 
embarkation training are incorporated in the squadron’s training plan and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP). This supports rapid mobilization and integration of the unit 
with the MAGTF.  
 All VMUX UAS must be capable of operating in conventional and 
unconventional combat operations. This includes the ability to withstand the harsh 
conditions of severe weather, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) threats, and 
attacks by air defense missile systems, small arms fires, electronic warfare (EW) systems, 
and the encounter of other manned or unmanned enemy aircraft.  
2. Manning Concept of Operations 
The manning of the VMUX will be similar to the current structure in that it will 
have a mix of officers and enlisted Marines that will be combined to form a more 
cohesive and flexible unit when deployed as a detachment. The manning ConOps is 
divided into operations and maintenance.  
a. Operations 
The operations department (S-3) will provide the officers to serve as MC 
and enlisted personnel to fill the other operational billets. The only modification to the 
current operational structure of a typical VMU is that the duties of the external pilot (EP), 
which is part of the operations department, may be combined with the duties of the Air 
Vehicle Mechanic (AVM) in the maintenance department.  This consolidates two 
manpower requirements into one billet with a well developed set of skills.  Currently, the 
NTSP for the RQ-2 Pioneer requires that EPs must first meet the required training as IP 
through formal school qualifications.37 This is the first departure from the traditional 
organizational structure. The operations team will include Mission Commanders (MC) 
                                                 
37 NAVAIR.  Navy Training System Plan for the RQ-2 Pioneer.  N-78-NTSP-A-50-8622D/A. August 
2004. p. I-23. 
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and Air Vehicle Operators (AVO). In accordance with NATOPS, all AVOs will be 
OPNAV Instruction 3710.7 Series qualified, with qualification and certification as 
Mission Commander or AVO managed by the individual’s parent unit.  
The Marine Corps has already established a good set of UAS related MOS 
billets in accordance with the current VMU manpower structure.  The specific titles and 
MOS designators developed in the RQ-2 Pioneer NTSP will serve as the foundation for 
the development of the manpower requirements for the VMUX and are shown in Table 4-
1.38  This research does not focused on specific MOS categories used to develop new 
UAS related MOS billets but rather, establish a foundation for the development of a new, 
more robust, flexible and scalable manpower structure. 
 
Table 3.   UAV Related Operational MOS Billets 
 
MOS TITLE 
7314 UAV operator (IP) 
7316* UAV External Pilot / UAV Mechanic (EP) 
7315 UAV Mission Commander (MC) 
0231 Intelligence Analyst (IA ) 
0241 Imagery Analyst (IA) 
*NOTE: Additional MOS as a UAV Mechanic (6214) 
 
The Marine Corps is currently reviewing the manpower structure that 
supports Tier II and Tier III programs. The critical focus of the two programs is the Tier 
II since it is the only level of support not managed by military personnel but by a fee-for-
service contract with Boeing Corporation.  The goal of the research to form a composite 
squadron is based on the study of the UAS program in the USMC, interviews, and  
 
 
                                                 
38 NAVAIR.  Navy Training System Plan for the RQ-2 Pioneer.  N-78-NTSP-A-50-8622D/A. August 
2004. p. I-25. 
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recommendations from members of VMU-1, MWATS-1, MCWL, MCSC and MCCDC 
who are involved in the development of capabilities and requirements for the tiers II and 
III of the UAS FoS.  
b.  Maintenance 
The maintenance manpower requirements were derived from the analysis 
of the manpower ConOps and the concept of employment as previously described.  The 
maintenance concept of operations is similar to that currently employed in the VMUs.  
Maintenance will be performed by Marine Corps personnel with skills resident within the 
maintenance fields prescribed in the NTSP for the RQ-2 Pioneer (N-78-NTSP-A-50-
8622D/A) and adapted for future systems that will replace Pioneer and other UAS 
platforms. 
Currently, four MOS billets are involved in the maintenance of UAV 
assets. The UAV mechanic (6214) is directly involved with the engine and structural 
maintenance of the Air Vehicle (AV). The Avionics Technician (6314) is responsible for 
the all electronic components of the AV including the payloads (i.e. IR cameras). The 
other two MOS billets are indirectly involved in the maintenance process. The Aircraft 
Support Equipment (ASE) Mechanic (6072) and the Aircraft Ordnance Technician 
(6531) are respectively responsible for handling the aircraft support equipment (i.e. 
Hydraulic system, Pneumatic system) and the ordnance of the AV.  The UAV 
maintenance related billets established by Navy and Marine Corps planners are shown in 
Table 4.  These MOSs were established in the RQ-2 Pioneer NTSP and serve as the 
foundation for the development of future skills sets for the replacement of the Pioneer 





                                                 
39 NAVAIR.  Navy Training System Plan for the RQ-2 Pioneer.  N-78-NTSP-A-50-8622D/A. August 
2004. p. I-22. 
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Table 4.   UAV Related Maintenance MOS Billets 
 
MOS TITLE 
6214* UAV Mechanic / UAV External Pilot (AVM) 
6072 Aircraft Support Equipment Mechanic (AVSE) 
6314 UAV Avionics Technician (AVT) 
6531 Aircraft Ordnance Technician (AVORD) 
*NOTE: Additional MOS as a UAV External Pilot/UAV Mechanic (7316) 
 
3. Training Concept of Operations 
An important goal of the training program for UAS personnel is to provide the 
Marine Corps with qualified Mission Commanders, AV Operators, and maintenance 
personnel for the effective and safe employment of UAV systems. The knowledge, skills 
and abilities required to grow these professionals is the program foundation.  The proper 
development and implementation of adequate and relevant training will ensure the 
designated personnel who serve in these billets possess the necessary knowledge and 
skills to support UAS operations throughout the spectrum of combat scenarios.  As with 
other major programs, the development of the training courses should be done with the 
participation of the contractor.  They will develop and conduct familiarization training for 
all billets until the activation of a training facility. The courses should focus on initial 
training requirements for the MC, IP, PO, and the maintenance technicians (AVT, 
AVORD, and AVM). Military instructors should be developed to take over the operations 
of the training facilities after they have completed a tour in a VMU designated UAV 
billet.    
The training facility should be co-located with one of the operating VMUs at 
MCAGCC 29-Palms, CA or MCAS Cherry Point, NC.  This training facility will run like 
any other flight school that has its own Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) or 
Replacement Air Group (RAG). This creates the proper environment for students to learn  
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the knowledge and skills required to operate in the operating forces.  This realistic 
environment will serve to develop their abilities to complement the training and adapt to 
the culture of the VMU community.   
 The training hardware such as the GCS and PCS should have an enhanced version 
of the fleet Full Mission Capable Training Device and software.  This system should have 
a set of mission scenarios that will enhance training with a realistic approach and allow 
students to conduct emergency procedures and mission scenarios that will build on the 
knowledge and skills to develop the unique abilities required for these billets.  The 
maintenance training should include preventive/corrective maintenance and 
Troubleshooting workshops to create a realistic environment for operational readiness.  
There should be a seamless transition from school to operating forces in order to 
maximize the learning experience and minimize the learning curve when the students are 
transferred to their respective VMU. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Proposed Training Evolution From One Tier to the next 
 
 As a contingency plan, the FRS/RAG could support real world operations as 
required. This will require that the school house be set up with operational structure and 
composition of an active duty VMU.  From time to time, the VMU’s could augment their 

























































manpower structure and UAS platforms with a detachment from the school house to 
support missions that may require an augmented force.  The UAS training facility would 
provide a vital training environment that could minimize mishaps, enhance individual 
skills and hone specific abilities inherent in all UAS members. 
D.   FUTURE COMPOSITE-VMU (VMUX) MANPOWER STRUCTURE  
1. System Requirements 
The establishment of a composite squadron is not a new idea. What is new is the 
integration of the concept of employment developed by the Marine Corps and the 
manning proposed by this research.  The intent is to combine the System’s ConOps, 
Concept of Employment and the Manpower ConOps to produce an integrated solution to 
the conflict between capability requirements and manpower shortages.  The VMUX is the 
culmination of a year of research and experimentation as well as the optimization of 
resources to meet the capability requirements of the future of the Marine Corps UAS 
program.   
The first point of departure would be the addition of a third VMU so there may be 
a VMUX assigned to each of the Marine Air Wing (MAW) components. Additionally, 
there will be two more VMUX units in reserve.  One will be assigned to the Marine 
Corps Reserve Forces and the other will be an inactive unit within the training facility 
that will be run as an operating unit with the intent to create a realistic environment for 
the students. The latter will only be activated under special circumstances that warrant 
their deployment and by direction of the highest levels of command within the MAW.  A 
proposed composition of three VMUX detachments is shown in Appendix B. 
The proposed VMUX will be capable of conducting operations across the 
spectrum of combat operations.  Each detachment will have 4 UAS platforms and the 
capability to break down into smaller sections to provide split operations (hub and 
spoke). Each VMUX will have the following capabilities: 
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 a)  12 combined UAS platforms (6 Tier II and 6 Tier III). 
 b)  3 Ground Control Stations (GCS). 
 c)  6 Portable Control Stations (PCS). 
 d) Combined coverage of approximately 715 Km by 265Km when operating as a 
single unit located in the same area. 
 e)  Capable of conducting split ship-to-shore or split shore (Hub and spoke) 
operations on three separate fronts with extended range capabilities. 
 f)  Independent maintenance and rolling assets that facilitates the embarkation and 
movement of the unit when deployed with the MAGTF. 
 g)  16 to 24 hours of continuous on-station support for sustained and surge 
operations. 
The VMUX will not be required to maintain a logistical footprint of vehicles and 
other support assets to operate efficiently.  This task will be delegated to the Marine 
Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) within the MAW.  Currently, the MWSS is the 
Aviation Ground Support (AGS) element of the MAW for all manned aviation 
squadrons.  The abundance of rolling stock (trucks and engineer equipment), medical 
support and maintenance capability inherent in the MWSS will be sufficient to support 
the VMUX and provide the required manpower and equipment support to conduct 
operations. The Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) will provide the technical 
support to facilitate the reduction of squadron manpower requirements.  Altogether, the 
analysis for the modifications to the manpower structure and the re-allocation of 
logistical responsibilities will enhance the ability of the VMUX to effectively perform its 
mission as it enters a new age of integration in the Marine Corps to operate in a joint 
environment. 
2. Manpower Requirements 
a. Operational Manpower Requirements 
The required number of AV operators is driven by the Concept of 
Employment. The recommended number of members in each detachment is specified in 
Table 5. This table was created from a notional organizational structured derived from the 
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current VMU composition. The numbers depicted in the table reflect the quantities of 
personnel of each specialty assign to a specific station. For example, the number of MC 
in a PCS is zero since there is no need to have a MC at a PCS.  However, there are two 
IPs and two POs assigned to each PCS. The numbers add up to complete a squadron size 
element as the aggregation of stations goes from one PCS to two PCS and so on all the 
way up to the entire composition of three detachments per squadron.  The intent is to 
complement each station with the right manpower capability to provide up to 24 hours of 
continuous on-station operational support.   
 
Table 5.   Operational Manpower Requirements for the VMUX  
 MC IP EP* PO IA TOTALS 
PCS-1 0 2 2 2 0 6 
PCS-2 0 2 2 2 0 6 
GCS (x1) 2 2 2 2 4 10 
       
DET (x3) 2 6 6 6 4 24 
SQDN 6 18 18 18 16 72 
*NOTE: The external Pilot duties will be consolidated with the duties of the Maintenance Personnel 
 
Each Squadron will be composed of three detachments. Each Detachment 
will have one GCS and two PCS.  Each station (GCS or PCS) will have two full crews to 
operate the four platforms that will be part of the detachment.  The only exception to the 
crew composition is that neither PCS will have a MC or IA in their organic composition. 
These two billets will reside in the GCS and can be distributed as needed during 
operations. Each PCS has six Marines.  The GCS will have a total of ten Marines which 
includes the two MC, two PO, two IP and four IA (two Intelligence Analysts and two 
Imagery Analysts).  That means that there will be 24 Marines in each detachment that 
will operate four UAS platforms.  Each detachment will contain two Tier II (Shadow 
200) and two Tier III (VTUAS) platforms.  Each squadron will be comprised of three 
detachments. This gives a VMUX the ability to configure their assets and personnel to 
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meet a wide range of missions. Each squadron will have 72 Marines that will operate  
12 UAS platforms (six Tier II and six Tier III).  
The numbers selected for this notional manpower structure is driven by 
the operational scenarios and system composition that are currently planned for the future 
of the UAS FoS in accordance with the USMC Vision.40  The endurance requirement 
specified in the Concept of Operations above for 12 hours of continuous on-station 
support, at 110NM requires approximately a 16-hour operating cycle. Each PCS will 
have two crews that can maintain an 8-hour watch, 6 hours of on-station time per AV and 
2 hours of overlap for transition from one AV to another.  The GCS also has two full 
crews to include an extra MC for contingency and back up and two extra IA for 
deployment with the PCs if needed.  This allows the GCS to operate for a 16-hour or 24-
hour operating cycle depending on how the detachment is configured (i.e. split or 




Figure 15.   Notional Depiction of a VMUX Detachment 
 
                                                 
40 Marine Unmanned Vehicle Squadron (VMU) Organizational Structure Presentation. MAWTS-1, 
UAS Division. March 2007. Slide 5. 
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Flight safety and crew rest requirements have been incorporated in the 
assessment of the number of crews per station. This ensures that qualified operators (MCs 
and AV operators) are assigned for each watch station during normal operating hours. 
During surge operations, the detachment/squadron can be configured to support 24/7 
operations for an extended period of time. The exact time period for surge operations 
should determined by the CO of each VMU considering the mission, environment and 
other relevant factors affecting the effectiveness of the crew and safety of flight 
operations. 
b. Maintenance Manpower Requirements 
The required number of maintenance personnel is driven by the Concept 
of Employment and the Manning Concept of Operations. The recommended number of 
members in each station/detachment/squadron is specified in Table 4-4.  This table was 
created from a notional organizational structured derived from the current VMU 
composition. The numbers depicted in the table reflect the quantities of personnel of each 
specialty assign to a specific station. 
 
Table 6.   Maintenance Manpower Requirements for the VMUX 
 PC AVM* AVT TOTALS 
PCS-1 0 0 0 0 
PCS-2 0 0 0 0 
GCS (x1) 1 4 4 9 
     
DET (x3) 1 4 4 9 
SQDN 3 12 12 27 
*NOTE: The Maintenance Personnel duties will be consolidated with the duties of the external Pilot.  
 
The maintenance cell of the VMUX detachment will be structured around 
the operational cell to support all four UAS platforms.  This allows the detachment to 
operate remotely, autonomously and independent from the squadron’s main body. It also 
allows the detachment to operate in concert with other detachments which may be co-
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located in the same operating area by pooling resources to enhancing their capabilities.  
Each Detachment will have 11 maintenance Marines from the required MOS billets.  All 
maintenance personnel will be co-located with the Detachment’s GCS to provide 
maximum flexibility and economy of force. With this flexible force, the detachment’s 
MC can detach members of the maintenance cell to support a PCS when conducting split 
operations.   
The numbers selected for this notional maintenance manpower structure is 
driven by the operational scenarios and system composition that are currently planned for 
the future of the UAS FoS in accordance with the USMC Vision.41  The maintenance 
personnel will be capable of conducting preventive and corrective maintenance for all 
UAS platforms.  The preventive maintenance will consist of pre-flight and post-flight 
inspections and routine services as prescribed by NATOPS. These include but are not 
limited to takeoff and landing inspections, acceptance inspections and initial buildup, and 
corrosion control and preservation.  The corrective maintenance will involve all minor 
structural repairs as well as fault isolation and access, removal, and repair or replacement 
of failed components to the lowest level replaceable assembly.42 
3. Other Manpower Requirements 
One of the proposed changes to optimize VMUX manning levels is to reduce the 
logistics footprint by requesting logistics support to the MWSS and Ordnance and 
avionics support to the MALS.  This will decrease the number of manpower billets 
inherent in the VMUX and utilize existing resources that already support other units 
within the MAW.   
There are five MOS billets that will be required to support the VMUX from the 
MWSS and the MALS.  These MOS billets, along with the rolling stock and GSE  
 
                                                 
41 Marine Unmanned Vehicle Squadron (VMU) Organizational Structure Presentation. MAWTS-1, 
UAS Division. March 2007. Slide 5.   
42 NAVAIR.  Navy Training System Plan for the RQ-2 Pioneer.  N-78-NTSP-A-50-8622D/A. August 
2004. p. I-23. 
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required to support the VMUX will be outsourced in the same manner as every other 
Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) unit.  Table 7 is a list of MOS designators and title of all 
the supported billet requirements.43 
Table 7.   UAV Outsourcing MOS Designators 
MOS TITLE 
3531 Motor Vehicle Operator (MVO) 
3521 Organizational Automotive Mechanic (MVM) 
1141 Electrician (EL) 
0651 Data Network Specialist (COMM) 
6072 Aircraft Support Equipment (SE)/hydraulic/Pneumatic/Structures Mechanic (AVSE) 
6531 Aircraft Ordnance Technician (AVORD) 
 
 All of the motor transport, utilities and communications support will come from 
the MWSS.  The Aviation technicians and ordnance technicians will come from the 
MALS. This requirement to request support to the MWSS and the MALS currently exists 
in the Marine Air Group (MAG) that operate with manned aircrafts. Consequently, the 
change within the MAW community, where UAS units reside, is cultural and not 
structural.   
 
Table 8.   UAV Outsourcing Manpower Requirements 
 MVO MVM EL COMM AVSE AVORD TOTALS
PCS-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PCS-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GCS (x1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
DET (x3) 6 2 2 2 1 1 14 
SQDN 18 6 6 6 3 3 42 
 
                                                 
43 USMC.mil.  (MOS List). http://www.uspharmd.com/usmc/cgi-bin/mos.cgi. Accessed May 2007. 
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4. Method of Employment 
The results of the newly configured VMUX will provide an enhanced capability 
with more flexible manpower structure and a reduced logistical footprint.  This will allow 
the MAGTF commander to employ these assets more effectively.  Currently, the VMU is 
designated to deploy as an entire unit.  The VMUX will not only be able to deploy as 
separate detachments, but may even scale its force down to capabilities modules within a 
detachment to support smaller operations during peacetime and other non-combat 
contingencies. 
 The MAGTF commander would be able to tailor the VMUX force to deploy them 
more effectively to meet a wide variety of missions.  More importantly, the newly 
proposed manpower structure will minimize the manpower billets required to operate and 
manage the VMUX.  The integration tiers II and III, into one composite squadron, would 
create savings that would offset the cost of alternatively providing more GCS and PCS 
for each VMUX. 
 Finally, the functions and capabilities of the VMUX will be ahead of current 
efforts by other services to meet DoD’s requirement to develop and establish joint 
standards, transformational capabilities and control cost.  DoD’s goals to develop a joint 
unmanned combat aircraft system capable of performing suppression of enemy air 
defenses (SEAD), Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), in a high threat 
environment will be facilitated by the template of integrated capabilities that will be 
inherent in the Marine Corps’ VMUX.44   
a. Sustained Operational Requirements 
With the implementation of the newly proposed VMUX, the Marine Corps 
would exceed the capability requirements established by the concept of employment 
planned for the VTUAS.45  The VTAUS NTSP requires that a single system be capable 
                                                 
44 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005–2030.  Exec 
Summary. 
45 NAVAIR.  Navy Training System Plan for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle. N-75-NTSP-A-50-0004/D. June 2001. p. 7. 
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of providing 12 hours of continuous on-station support and provide coverage for 110NM 
within a 24-hour period. It is also expected that the VTUAS be capable of providing 24-
hour coverage when two or more systems are assigned to one MAGTF element. 
During sustained operations, a VMUX detachment could position one 
GCS and one PCS in the same location to provide a back up system support. The other 
PCS could be deployed to extend the radius of the systems and allow for coverage of over 
200Km.  Figure 16 shows how this capability will be employed in one random scenario.  
 
 
Figure 16.   Sustained Operations Using One VMUX Detachment 
 
The above described capability would be considered standard for every 
VMUX detachment.  Furthermore, the reach and endurance of the VMUX squadron 
would be extended when detachments are combined. This unique composition would 
support more missions from multiple units, located in different areas. 
b. Surge Operational Requirements 
One of the most pervasive problems currently affecting the VMUs is their 
inability to operate independently without moving their massive logistical footprint.   
Once a VMU is on station, it must augment its capabilities with additional UAV systems 
from the other squadron in order to meet mission requirements.  This presents a critical 
gap in capability when the mission requires a surge in operations.  The current structure 
of the VMU is augmented by ScanEagle civilian staff.  The staff is not part of the 
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squadron’s T/O&E, but is required to fulfill assigned MAGTF missions.  The potential 
for mishaps and crew risk is increased when the requirements for more on station assets 
is in surge operations.  The same concept of employment planned for the VTUAS, 
requires that one system be capable of providing 24-hour coverage when two or more 
systems are assigned to one MAGTF element.46 
The VMUX must be capable of managing the surge requirements for any 
mission with just one detachment.  It must fill the capability gap and fulfill the MAGTF 
commander’s mission requirements without increasing the mishaps risk of, hazards or 
crew safety.  More importantly, it must be able to scale its force to provide 24 hours of 
continuous on station support by employing all four platforms and its three control 
stations (GCS and two PCS) in a hub and spoke configuration.  This means that each 
detachment within the VMUX must be able to provide 24/7 continuous on-station support 
to maintain a surge level of for a limited period of time.  Figure 17 is a graphic depiction 
of how the VMUX detachment will conduct surge operations. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Surge Operations of One Vmux Detachment 
 
When operating as one unit, the combined capabilities of a VMUX, would 
provide an extended surge capability for an indefinite period of time.  This is the result of 
an integrated approach to the concept of parallel development of capabilities with 
                                                 
46 NAVAIR.  Navy Training System Plan for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle. N-75-NTSP-A-50-0004/D. June 2001. p. 7. 
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manpower requirements in one comprehensive process consistent with desired goals.  
The examples provided for the sustained and surge operational configuration are notional 
concepts of the range of capability  The key aspect of this entire process is that this 
recommendation, minimizes manpower requirements and logistical footprint, improves 
current system capabilities, and provides a robust, flexible and scalable force to execute a 
wide range of missions with any size MAGTF. 
E. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
1. A New Perspective (Joint Ops) 
As DoD’s requirements for the development of increased joint capability are 
pushed to each of the services, there’s a concerted effort to strike a balance between 
standardization and service specific mission requirements.  The transformation that is 
ongoing throughout DoD makes it more critical that our UAS FoS meets this challenge 
with a new perspective.  While there are some important aspects to consider when 
developing a new and innovative approach, the opportunity to explore new perspectives 
to existing problems must be inherent in our culture.  This is the idea behind the creation 
of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL).   
Consequently, the recommendations contained in this research are a departure 
from standard concepts and a new perspective on how we develop capabilities and 
manpower requirements in concert.  The VMUX can become a functional operating unit 
in the Marine Corps but it needs to be supported by the advocates and agencies that are 
charged with fostering this type of innovative approach.  The possibility that the entire 
process may have flaws is reasonable, but the template on which this recommendation is 
based has a great potential to become a reality in this decade. 
2. Cost 
The Marine Corps budget is small in comparison with the other services. Marine 
Financial planners constantly work the budget figures to allocate resources effectively 
and make critical decisions about which of the many budget requirements for capabilities 
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development to fund. Many programs are victims of this ranking process which makes it 
difficult to promote a capability that is a shift from what currently exists in the inventory.  
It is difficult to absorb the financial cost of a concept that requires the creation of a 
composite squadron with 12 UAS platforms, but this cost could be countered by arguing 
that the recommendations provided reduce the manpower requirement of each VMUX by 
about 10% from 180 Marines to about 160. Additionally, the squadron rolling stock 
would be reduced and the logistical and maintenance requirements to manage those assets 
will also be reduced.  Moreover, the communications, medical and other support 
requirements will become null as the squadron becomes more lean and specialized to 
carry out its main mission and functions.  The generated savings from this consolidation 
would streamline the process and bring about greater cost reduction. Therefore, the 
notion that this will cost more than is worth is debatable and would require a detail  cost 
and benefit analysis to assess the actual outcome of the costs associated with the 
modification and restructuring of the UAS community. 
3. Obstacles 
The most challenging obstacle that this type of new perspective faces within the 
Marine culture is that of acceptance and further development.  Advocates for this 
community have done extensive research and development on current and future 
approaches to the UAS FoS capabilities requirements for 2030.  It will be difficult to win 
the hearts and minds of those who are charged with developing similar approaches. 
Another consideration is further research funding. This research was achieved 
without the support and funding of any Marine Corps organization, despite the 
overwhelming amount of requests sent to all branches of the research community for 
assistance and support. It is difficult to find the needed assistance and financial support 
when there are so many competing interests that have priorities in a time of war.  
Finally, any research must be validated and examined to verify its accuracy and 
feasibility of application.  This may be one of many research reports that must wait its 
turn to be discovered. This notion of waiting might just be the greatest detriment in our 
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ability to find the most optimal solution. There are never enough manpower resources to 
meet the needs of every requirement which is the primary reason for this research.   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter qualitatively analyzes the feasibility of a proposed solution to the 
manpower issues that surround Tier II and III of the UAS FoS.  It highlights the inherent 
challenges to the development of a manpower structure and how DoD’s push for a joint 
unmanned Aerial vehicle validates the need for the consolidation and restructure of our 
current UAS force.  The chapter briefly outlines the organizational structure of the 
current VMUs.  The concept of operations, concept of employment and the manning 
concept of ops are examined to develop future force structure requirements.    
 The concepts are used to develop a notional manpower structure for a composite 
VMU squadron that includes tiers II and III assets notionally called VMUX.  Finally, the 
chapter briefly highlights some of the challenges that impede the implementation of these 
notional force structure changes.  Though this research took about a year to develop, it 
well may be the next template of for unmanned vehicle units.  Manpower is a costly asset 
and the efficient use of our manpower assets will always be a benefit to the entire force.  
The objective of this chapter is to serve as a starting point for the development of new 
perspectives for further research into more efficient ways to provide manpower savings. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
 This research is the first known academic study analyzing and recommending 
operational manning requirements for the Unmanned Aerial Systems Family of Systems 
(UAS FoS) for the USMC.  It began with an assessment of the status of manpower 
structures in the current UAS community, and qualitatively assessed the manpower 
requirements and logistical impact of the different strategies being considered for the 
Marine Corps’ Tier II and III of the UAS FoS.   
The objective and goal was to analyze and recommend a manpower structure to 
support the tiers II &II of UAS FoS development. The research examined the following:   
the current composition of the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU); the 
recommended location and structure of the Marine UAS training facility to develop the 
knowledge, skills and abilities required in the UAS community; and costs and benefits of 
a new squadron structure combining (Tier II & III) the VMU squadron versus two 
separate squadrons.  
The study uncovered key aspects of the considerable challenge facing the UAS 
FoS in the Marine Corps and the need for a robust, flexible and scalable manpower 
structure to improve and hasten adaptation to emerging new technology in this warfare 
arena.  The origins and background of UAS development and the history of the UAS 
program in the USMC are described for context purposes.  The research illuminated 
pitfalls contributing to the imbalance in capabilities and manpower requirements and 
offers developmental recommendations 
The efforts of early planners to incorporate UAV technology into the USMC 
appeared detached from how the technology would flow within the acquisition process. 
For example, the RQ-2 Pioneer interim program became a funded program despite 
shortfalls in the capability development process.  Even with shortfalls, this asset has been 
deemed successful in terms of filling a needed capability gap.  Conversely, an insufficient 
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program development process adversely impacted the manning of the squadrons  
created to fulfill the UAS missions of the Marine Corps. 
In sum, a re-structuring of the manpower force in the UAS community is needed, 
and a new perspective for Tier II and III UAS manning is offered, i.e., a composite 
squadron for two tiers of UAV systems to optimize manpower requirements and to 
reduce the logistics footprint of the current VMUU.  Cost savings would likely result 
from combining the training, operations and management of separate UAS squadrons.   
Chapter IV describes the recommendation for the re-structuring of the current 
VMU into a composite VMU (VMUX).  The methodology used to develop this 
manpower structure included a review of doctrinal publications and documents related to 
UAS operations, both within the Marine Corps, across the Services and at the DoD level. 
Input and expert opinion was also incorporated in the study from VMU-1, the MCWL, 
MCCDC, MWATS-1 and industry experts from the private sector.   
The analysis of this research envisions an increased capability with a robust, 
flexible and scalable force that can be adapted to meet UAS needs into the future. The 
initial intent to form separate squadrons evolved into the documented and innovative 
approach to merge the assets from the two top tiers of the UAS FoS program.  To 
summarize, a composite squadron would likely generate both savings and expanded 
capability of the current VMU, as well as decreased manning requirements.   
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
a. What Notional Manpower Structure Would Best Support the Tier 
II & Tier III of the UAS Fos? 
Conclusion: 
• An analysis of the current manpower structure of the Tier II UAS 
concluded that the for the fee-for-service contract currently in place with Boeing 
Corporation needs to be replaced by active duty personnel.  It became apparent early in 
the research that the creation of a separate, additional squadron for the Tier II assets was 
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challenging both from a capability as well as a manning perspective.  The research 
challenge is to find a way to incorporate the Tier II assets, with USMC manpower and 
force structure required to replace the fee-for-service contract with ScanEagle, while 
maintaining the same levels of support to the current UAS missions.  
Recommendation:  
• Combine Tier II and III assets and personnel under one marine 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle squadron to form a composite VMU squadron (VMUX).  This 
is comparable with the current concept of operations of the VMU squadrons with 
ScanEagle civilian personnel who work side-by-side with their military counterparts.  
The merger of two Tier III assets (VTUAS) and two Tier II assets (Shadow 200) would 
create economies of scale and increase capabilities to the field commander. 
• Combine the EP and AVM duties so the maintenance section 
becomes responsible for all external AV operations (takeoff and landing).  This will 
reduce the manpower requirement of one key billet and place more responsibility on the 
department responsible for handling the safe and effective operation of the AV prior and 
after the launch.  There is considerable concern about how this may impact the operations 
and performance of the unit, as well as the safety and regulations of current NATOPS, 
but it is worth analyzing the feasibility of this proposal to validate the recommendation. 
• Relinquish all logistics, transport and avionics requirements to 
other units such as the MWSS and MALS to minimize the squadron’s organic footprint 
and allow for more flexible and effective deployments and operations.  This will allow 
the VMU to focus on its core competencies and mission rather than managing AGS 
assets.  All other manned squadrons in the Marine Corps use the MWSS and MALS to 
coordinate their ground logistics, transport, air logistics and avionics needs.  The VMU 
should not continue to be the sole proprietor of assets that do not directly contribute to 
mission accomplishment. 
• Grow the UAS community to a total of five Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle squadrons.  Increase the current active duty squadrons from two to three so each 
MAW has an independent UAS capability. Grow to additional squadrons in reserve. One 
of these squadrons will be assigned to Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) and the  
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other one will be a Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS/RAG) used at the training facility 
to enhance the training of students in a realistic environment and serve as a contingency 
squadron..   
• Re-structure each squadron so they are broken down into three 
independent and autonomous detachments capable of deploying and operating as one 
organic asset in support of a MATFG element.  Each detachment will have two Tier II 
assets and two Tier III assets with associated operations and maintenance personnel. Each 
detachment would be augmented by the MWSS and the MALS depending on mission 
requirements. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What Notional Logistics Support is Required to Maintain and 
Operate a Deployed UAS Unit? 
Conclusion:   
• The current VMU configuration does not provide the flexibility to 
deploy sections or detachments of a squadron.  It can only deploy as a whole to a single 
location, where it may be tasked to conduct split operations with limited capabilities to 
operate 24 hours a day.  This reduces its effectiveness and overburdens the two VMU’s in 
the USMC operating forces.   
Recommendation: 
• Transfer logistical requirements to the MWSS, and all avionics and 
ordnance requirements to the MALS. This will likely make the proposed VMUX more 
responsive, flexible and light, with a smaller logistics footprint.  
• Reduce the manpower footprint by transferring all logistics 
responsibilities to the MWSS and the MALS. Additionally, this will result in manpower 
efficiencies requirements in other squadron areas such as administration, ground vehicle 
maintenance and communications. These changes will cause the VMUX to focus on core 
competencies and primary missions.  These recommendations incorporated at each level 
of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) will increase the organic, interoperable, 
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integrated and tailored capabilities provided to the warfighter’s situational awareness 
through a common C2 architecture across the range of military operations.47   
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND STUDY 
There are six recommendations for further research to advance the concept of the 
composite VMU (VMUX). 
• Conduct a cost and benefit analysis of reducing the logistics manpower 
and equipment associated with supporting VMU UAS operations and outsource those 
billets and equipment to the MWSS and MALS units in the MAW. 
• Conduct a feasibility KSA analysis to determine the realistic probability 
that the EP and the AVM duties and responsibilities can be combined in one manpower 
billet to reduce the manning requirements of the VMUX operating and maintenance 
force. 
• Conduct a Cost and Benefits Analysis to determine if the composite 
squadron can operate more effectively and efficiently than as a separate, tier specific unit. 
The emphasis should be on the manpower cost of each alternative. 
• Conduct a research study on the development of a training facility at the 
MCAGCC in 29 Palms independent of other Services training facilities and configured to 
resemble the organizational structure of a typical active duty VMUX. 
• Conduct a study of the cost of adding a third VMUX squadron to the 
active forces and another squadron to the reserve forces. 
• Identify the KSA’s required to grow a robust UAS force that can be scaled 




                                                 
47 MCCDC, USMC VISION. UAV Family of Systems (FoS) Document. September 2005. 
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(Tier II/III Composite Squadron )
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X 3 Dets  = 
Rolling Assets
(3) 7 TON or HMMWV(GCS)  W/TRAILER (GEN)
(6) HMMWV (PCS) W/TRAILER (GEN)
(3) HMMWV (TCU) W/TRAILER (GEN)
(3) HMMWV (C2)
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170 Marines (120 Det + 50 HQ)
12 UAV Platforms
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• 3 Dets = 1 VMU
• VMU HQ element:
– Command 3 (CO, XO, 1st Sgt)
– S-1 4 (Chief, UD, PARs, 2 Admin Clerks)
– S-2 3 (1 intel Off, Intel Analyst)
– S-3 5 (Current Ops Off, Future Ops Off, 
Trng Chief, Ops Clerk
– S-4 8 (1 OFF, 1 WO, Supp, Log, 
Ammo/Armory, Embark
– S-6 7 (Chief Data, Radio, Repairman) 
– Misc 20 (Drivers, additional billets Safety, NATOPS)



























• HQ Element = 50 Marines (Officers and Enlisted)
• Detachment = 40 Marines x 3 dets = 120 Marines (Ops/Maint Supp)
• TOTAL VMU Strength = 170
• CAPABILITIES
• 12 Assets (Composite squadron – 6 Tier III and 6 Tier II Platforms)
• 3 GCS/TCU, 6 PCS 
• 3 separate Maint teams with independent capabilities
• Independent rolling assets
• 16 to 24 hrs ops (Sustain and Surge capability)
• ASSETS
•3 7-ton trucks (Not including redundancy)
• 27 HMMWVs (Operational dets only)
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